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of Lampedusa is home to a population of 6000. Residents are largely reliant on a 
centuries-old fishing economy, a booming tourism industry and, most recently, the 
sustainment of a complex apparatus of border enforcement. Since the early 2000s, with 
the hardening of the southern border of Italy and the European Union, a multitude of 
actors have converged to Lampedusa: from migrants, to agents of enforcement, to NGO 
personnel, along with journalists, researchers and tourists. In this thesis, I center the 
experiences of island residents to analyze the daily, lived dimensions of Lampedusa 
becoming a key site for the externalization of enforcement and the production of a border 
spectacle depicting “migration crisis.” Employing ethnographic methods and drawing 
from literature in feminist geopolitics, critical border studies and spatial theory, this 
approach looks beyond the nation state to discuss the everyday construction of borders 
and geopolitics. In doing so, I focus on the contested and relational nature of bordering 
on the island, highlighting some of the contradictions and inconsistencies of discourses 
and policies rooted in the premise of sudden emergency in the Mediterranean. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
"An island is for all seasons and for all tastes.  
An island can be both paradise and prison, both heaven and hell.  
An island is a contradiction between openness and closure,  
between roots and routes, which islanders must continually negotiate"  
(Baldacchino, 2007) 
With its 7.8 square miles in total surface and a population of just over 6000, the 
island of Lampedusa is hardly imposing in size, and yet it has grown in symbolic magnitude 
over the years. The southernmost point in Italy and entry point into the European Union 
(EU), Lampedusa is located on the 35th parallel, approximately 127 miles off the southern 
shores of Sicily and only 70 miles from the north African nation of Tunisia [See Figure 1]. 
Lampedusa is the largest island in the Pelagie archipelago, which also includes Linosa and 
uninhabited Lampione. Over the past two decades, the island has been a recurring feature 
in media coverage, political speeches and public debates, a site that evokes a complex set 
of seemingly incompatible imaginaries; Lampedusa is at once a marine paradise nestled in 
the Mediterranean and a highly militarized setting that serves as a key asset in the regime 
of EU and Italian border enforcement. It is an island that has made headlines as a border 
deathscape, while also becoming commonly associated with solidarity and 
humanitarianism. As Italian legal scholar Paolo Cuttitta writes, starting in the early 2000s 
Lampedusa entered the collective imaginary as “quintessential embodiment of the Euro-
African migration and border regime” (2014:199). 
Until the 1980s, fishing was the island’s main source of revenue. Since then, marine 
diversity and natural beauty projected Lampedusa to the status of renowned destination of 
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mass tourism from all over Italy (Taranto 2017, Lampedusa Pelagie 2019). Lampedusa’s 
Isle of Rabbits beach was event selected as the most beautiful in Europe in 2013 (Corrao, 
2014), and in Italy in 2019 (Redazione Ansa, 2019).  Between the 1990s and early 2000s, 
with the establishment of the European Community and the harmonization of laws 
regulating mobility and border enforcement among member-states, Lampedusa became a 
pivotal point of access into Fortress Europe and a strategic node for the monitoring of 
irregular migration through the EU’s southern frontier.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Lampedusa. (Tonielli et al, 2016) 
Ministry of the Interior data shows that if in 1999, 356 migrants reached the island’s 
shores, by 2002 the number had increased to 9,669, with arrivals peaking in 2011 at a 
record 51,753 (Askavusa 2018, Cuttitta 2012). Though vessels en route for Lampedusa 
mainly depart from Tunisia and Libya, their passengers come from all over Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), from countries such as Tunisia, 
Eritrea, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Algeria, Iraq and Sudan (Askavusa 2018, UNHCR 
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2019b). Throughout this thesis, I refer to maritime arrivals using the term commonly 
employed by the people of Lampedusa: “sbarchi” (translates to disembarkation).   
The use of the word “migrant” is in itself a generic simplification of the diverse 
statuses of those reaching Lampedusa; some are what the Italian legislative framework 
would categorize as “irregular migrants,” that is individuals that reached the country 
without an entry visa or that have since lost the necessarily requisites for a lawful stay. 
Irregular migrants identified at the point of entry can be turned away, while those who are 
found in violation inside the national territory are deported back to their country of origin 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2017b). Lampedusa also sees the arrival of asylum seekers, a 
category protected by both international law and the Italian constitution. Asylum seekers 
flee persecution because of race, religion, political affiliation, nationality, or membership 
to ethnic or social groups (UNHCR, 2010). It should be noted that these status 
determinations do not take place in Lampedusa, which serves as site of initial identification 
before migrants are transferred to the mainland, leaving travelers in a state of limbo. Here, 
I use “migrant” as an all-encompassing term, not to flatten the important differences 
between statuses, but for ease of discussion in the face of the complexity and intelligibility 
of migratory flows converging on the island.  
In this thesis, I apply ethnographic methods to analyze the relational construction 
of bordering in Lampedusa across space and time. Here, I explore some of the ways in 
which the unique geopolitical context on the island impacts the experiences of a sample of 
local residents. In seeking to look beyond a God’s Eye view of bordering through state 
practices and official enforcement activities, this project centers Lampedusa’s residents as 
both agents of bordering and as individuals whose lives are importantly shaped by the 
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border. Analyzing how bordering is manifested and articulated through the perspective of 
participants offers a window into the continued production of difference between mobile 
citizens from the Global North and immobile migrants from the Global South, which 
shapes individual experiences and possibilities at the border and beyond. In examining the 
modes of reproduction and enactment of these hierarchies of difference through everyday 
interactions and events, this approach can highlight opportunities for disruption and 
resistance to seemingly mundane state practices of border enforcement, monitoring and 
representation.  
Lampedusa, which in the past decade alone has received visits from Matteo Salvini 
(Lauria, 2017), the Pope (Carli, 2013), and high ranking officials from the European Union 
(EU) (Viviano 2013, European Commission 2017),  is a highly visible geography in what 
De Genova and others refer to as “border spectacle,” that is the mass circulation of images 
and notions of borders that go on to create a “constant redundancy” to justify the exclusion 
and fetishizing of illegal migrants (De Genova 2013:2, 2002, Van Reekum 2016, Cuttitta 
2012, 2014). As Cuttitta argues, the dramatic re-telling of the border staged in Lampedusa 
is ultimately intended for an audience of mobile citizens, powerful politicians and fearful 
migrants on the mainland, all turning their attention to the performance unfolding in the 
“scenic space” of the island (2012:95). For this reason, exploring inconsistencies, 
contradictions and the contested nature of bordering in Lampedusa where discourses about 
the border are staged, can contribute to challenging dehistoricized narratives of “migrant 
emergency” or “Mediterranean crisis,” to instead begin to show the daily, relational 
production of geopolitics at Italy’s and Europe’s southern border.  
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I. The Border 
Since the 1980s, scholars have explored new theorizations of borders, challenging 
approaches that frame borders as sharp, fixed divisions between entirely coherent and 
wholly separate units. Balibar’s influential contributions to the field of border studies 
problematize “reductions of complexity” which do not reflect the unstable nature of 
borders, divisions that the author explains to be continuously renegotiated and shifting 
(2002:76). While political borders may be fictional fault lines that obscure connectivity 
and inbetweenness, these normative conventions have life-changing and world-making 
consequences which render the continued study of bordering all the more salient (Jones 
and Johnson 2016). Scholars in the interdisciplinary fields of critical border studies and 
feminist geopolitics have advanced epistemologies and methodologies that look to the 
embodied dimensions of bordering and to how racialized and gendered social hierarchies 
are produced and reproduced in everyday life (Mountz and Hyndman 2006, Rumford 2012, 
Brun 2017, Jones and Johnson 2016). With the expanding definition of borders as 
processual and shifting, the understanding of who is engaged in borderwork has also 
broadened, going beyond the state, the military and official agents of enforcement to also 
include a wide array of actors including migrants, NGO personnel and people living in 
border communities.   
For both Italy and the European Union, questions of management of the southern 
border have grown increasingly pressing and divisive (Amaro 2019, Dodman 2019, De 
Maio 2019). As of May 2019, Italy’s XVIII Legislature led by technocrat Giuseppe Conte 
is holding together the fragile coalition between Luigi Di Maio’s Cinque Stelle (Five Star) 
party and Matteo Salvini’s Lega (League), the former serving as Minister of Labor and the 
latter as Minister of the Interior. Salvini, a vocal EU-skeptic and advocate for strict border 
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control, is only the latest national leader to espouse a “zero-tolerance” approach to 
migration. In his short tenure as Minister, he has openly challenged the principles of non-
refoulment and initial processing as they are outlined by the Geneva Convention and the 
Dublin Regulation (Ruta 2019, Tondo 2018).   
More importantly, the increasingly draconian and exclusionary regime of 
enforcement can have devastating and at times deadly effects on those engaged in the 
crossing. The Mediterranean, and especially the Central Mediterranean route in which 
Lampedusa is located, is amongst the world’s deadliest borders, what scholars and 
commentators have referred to as “warscape” (Shringarpure et al. 2018), “deathscape” 
(Suvendrini-Perera 2013, 2010, De Leon 2015), and humanitarian battlefield (Musaró 
2016).  
This thesis considers the unique historical, geopolitical and social context on the 
island to better comprehend the situated production of bordering and difference in 
Lampedusa, which also some provide insights into enforcement and representation of the 
Mediterranean border in Italy and beyond.  
II. The Island  
In analyzing bordering in Lampedusa, I align myself with scholarship in island 
studies that embraces relationality to break with a long tradition of the fetishization of 
island as discrete, sealed off containers of people and cultures. Romanticization of islands 
as exotic, frozen in time and neatly contained societies are as pervasive in the collective 
imagination as they are problematic. These neo-colonial discourses relegate islanders to 
the status of reference groups or research subjects for explorers, missionaries, military 
strategists and researchers (Baldacchino 2008, Hay 2006, McCall 1994). Instead, I draw 
from the relational and dynamic understanding of islands spaces advanced by scholars 
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including Mountz, who discusses the production of a global “enforcement archipelago” of 
detention and externalization (2011), and Farinelli, who explores how island discourses 
and representations are employed in the construction of mainland identities (2017).  
The use of “islandness” instead of the more common “insularity” follows the 
conceptualization put forth by Godfrey Baldacchino, who argues that the latter term carries 
“a semantic baggage of separation and backwardness” (2004:272). Lampedusa’s 
islandness and its colonial history in relation to the mainland are at the root of many of the 
characteristics that make it a convenient geography for the externalization of migration 
management in the eyes of the state. As it is evidenced by the pivotal role played by islands 
such as Guantanamo, Nauru and Lesbos, at times of perceived emergency in the of the 
system of migration management islands become fundamental sites of struggle and the 
“persistent reconfigurations of sovereignty” (Loyd and Mountz, 2014:24). Lampedusa’s 
small size only complicates its position, as scientists and government projects alike have a 
history of framing minor islands as natural laboratories for the testing of new theories, 
practices and technologies (Baldacchino 2004, 2008).  
Though bordering is the focus of this project, it cannot be understood in isolation 
from Lampedusa’s colonial history and islandness. Over the past two decades, Lampedusa 
and its residents have witnessed the construction of a regime of border enforcement that 
made the island a reticent headquarter for military operations, humanitarian missions, 
mission camps, and research studies. With the imposition of mainland interests also came 
the proliferation of materials, images, and discourse about Lampedusa, authored by 
outsiders who do not fully participate in island life. Mindful of this established pattern and 
my own positioning as mainlander, I seek to center the knowledge of island residents and 
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connect migration management and border enforcement to other island dynamics and local 
concerns.  
III. Research Questions  
Q1: Along with the resident population, what other groups/actors are involved in 
bordering on the island?  
Q2: How do the participants see the intensification of bordering impacting economic 
activity and social interactions on the island? 
Q3: How do Lampedusa’s residents intervene in bordering by upholding, resisting, 
staffing or simply co-existing with the border?  
Guided by these research questions and a framework that centers the knowledge 
and embodied experiences of the resident population, I conducted an ethnographic study 
and created an archive secondary sources such as legislative documents, government data, 
and news articles to further contextualize resident interventions alongside island 
representations and official enforcement practices. My research shows that though 
bordering is now an integral part of Lampedusa’s economic, social and cultural life, it is 
highly contested, with multiple competing interests and commitments. The project also 
brings to light some of the contradictions and fundamental inaccuracies of spectacularized 
discourses about the island and Mediterranean migration. 
IV. Overview of Thesis  
In this research project, I investigate the engagement and experiences with 
bordering of a sample of sixteen of Lampedusa’s residents. In Chapter II, I situate this 
project within a conceptual framework that draws on literature in feminist geopolitics, 
critical border studies, and spatial theory.  After discussing the theoretical foundations for 
this project, I provide an overview of the interconnected migration management strategies 
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of securitization, externalization and humanitarianism, which importantly shape the 
approach to bordering in Lampedusa.  
In Chapter III, I explain the methods employed in carrying out this research, which 
include the compiling of a digital archive of secondary sources about Lampedusa, in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with 16 island residents and participant observation. Here, I 
provide a brief summary of the demographic characteristics and occupations of interview 
participants. Finally, I conclude the chapter by discussing the importance of reflexivity and 
positionality.  
Chapter IV gives a historical overview of bordering in Lampedusa to show how the 
progressive hardening of enforcement at Europe’s Southern Frontier impacted daily life 
and economic activity on the island since 1986. The chapter’s arc, from its starting point 
in 1986 to its focus on the way bordering intersected with the island’s lucrative tourism 
industry, is the result of interviews in which the residents offered their interpretation of the 
construction of Lampedusa as a key geography of the “enforcement archipelago.”  
In Chapter V, I discuss examples of resident engagements with bordering in more 
detail. I begin by considering several forms of activism and borderwork, some oppositional 
and some supporting and upholding the border and its functions. Then, I turn to a number 
of sites across the island in an approach that looks to space as the product of interrelations 
by actors with disparate and divergent aims. In doing so, I highlight that ordinary life and 
everyday spaces in Lampedusa can provide a window into the construction of bordering, 
what it makes visible, and what it obscures. Crucially, understanding borders as processual 
and relational allows for possible disruptions to oppressive and neocolonial practices of 
migration management and border enforcement.  
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Finally, I conclude with Chapter VI, where I summarize my findings and revisit the 
limits and potentials of this research approach.    
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Chapter II: Conceptual Framework 
 
As a geographer, I analyze bordering through a spatial lens, investigating how 
geopolitical developments are actualized in Lampedusa and how island people leverage 
their access to influence local, national and regional representations and decision-making. 
I begin by situating this project within the scholarship in feminist geopolitics and critical 
border studies, seeking to decenter territorialist epistemologies in favor of a broader 
understanding of geopolitics. I then provide an overview of the principles and enforcement 
practices driving migration management in the European Union with Lampedusa as an 
entry point into Italy and Europe. After providing a summary of the so-called “crisis” 
narratives centered on the EU southern border, I discuss the interconnected strategies of 
securitization, externalization and humanitarianism that have been central to bordering on 
the island of Lampedusa.  
I. Decentering the nation state 
Foundational in this research project is the argument that border spaces, practices, 
and experiences are the result of interactions between a multitude of actors (Jones and 
Johnson 2016, Rumford 2012, Scott et al 2018). This approach decenters the nation-state, 
while maintaining the importance of including legislation, official enforcement strategies, 
and conventional geopolitics in analyzing border dynamics. Though state-sponsored 
initiatives including military operations, sophisticated monitoring and limited paths to legal 
entry importantly shape the border, it is people who inform and enforce these governmental 
actions. Furthermore, those staffing, crossing, and living in spaces of bordering are also 
engaged in the production of “the border.” To advance this argument, I here consider 
critiques of methodological nationalism emerging in the interdisciplinary fields of feminist 
geopolitics, and critical border studies. 
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Since its emergence in the early 2000s, feminist geopolitics has advanced an 
understanding of “the political” as permeating all spheres of life. Intervening in this line of 
inquiry, I expand on the framing Lampedusa as a site of Italian and EU enforcement 
(Cuttitta 2007, 2012, Dines et al 2015) by contextualizing how geopolitics is co-constituted 
through everyday interactions on the island and how residents experience and participate 
in what are often identified as “global” processes, including the securitization of migration, 
externalization of enforcement, and the rise of humanitarianism.    
Critiquing the top-down approach of traditional geopolitics (Dalby 1998), feminist 
geopolitics encouraged a paradigm shift away from the nation-state and what scholars in 
the discipline have referred to as a “God’s eye” view of geopolitics (Massaro and Williams 
2013, Christian et al 2016), or the “God Trick” (Haraway 1998, Dowler and Sharp 2001). 
Objecting to the framing of state power as emanating from “somewhere” in what Dowler 
and Sharp call a “spectator” theory of knowledge (2001:168), feminist geopolitics 
investigates experiences at scales including the local, the household and the body to 
understand how geopolitical processes shape and are shaped by social life. This defies the 
conventional masculinist depiction of the state that centers an operational study of 
international relations, development and war. Feminist geopolitics highlights the 
femininization of everyday spaces and the erasure of women and marginalized populations 
from a geopolitics that has long centered soldiers in the battlefield and male leaders in the 
situation room (Massaro and Williams 2013), instead advancing an understanding of the 
“political” as permeating all spheres of life. 
The aim of feminist geopolitics is to first map the production of difference and 
power relations through embodied experiences across space, to then importantly point to 
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the consequences of such arrangements and “galvanize engagement” (Hyndman, 
2004:308). To this end, Lee and Pratt’s exploration of how state violence is manifested in 
the lives of Filipinos vying for citizenship in the US also showcases how Filipino migrants 
reclaim agency by building solidarity that problematizes and rejects the notion of 
citizenship as the ultimate mark of belonging and political engagement (2011). Similarly, 
in framing domestic violence as everyday terrorism, Pain argues that this paradigm shift 
can change how this type of violence is addressed, connecting suffering at different scales 
to prioritize strategies that tackle root, structural causes (2014). Here I strive to follow this 
approach to scholarship, one that in bringing to the foreground the embodied and visceral 
experiences of those implicated in geopolitical processes, advocates for a more accountable 
geopolitical future.   
To understand how power and marginality are constructed and maintained in 
everyday life, it is essential to consider the interaction between interconnected systems of 
gender, race, class, sexuality, nationality, legal status… (Massaro and Williams 2013, 
Dowler and Sharp, 2001). Intersectionality, that is the study of the convergence of multiple 
forms of oppression, is a pivotal research paradigm in feminist epistemologies. Expanding 
on black feminist thought where intersectionality originates (Crenshaw 1991, Hill Collins 
2000, King 1988), Dhamoon conceptualizes the project of “the mainstreaming of 
intersectionality.” Dhamoon argues that what gives intersectionality this potential for wide 
application it that it seeks to interpret social positions as relational and makes visible 
complex processes of differentiation (2011). In this project, I follow the author’s call for 
the incorporation of intersectional-type research paradigms in social inquiry across 
disciplines. 
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In applying an intersectional-type framework to the context of the island of 
Lampedusa, my analysis considers local categories of difference to avoid the facile 
replication of the “race-class-gender trinity” (Mounture 2007, Dahmoon, 2011:234), that 
is, a paradigm that while essential to intersectional inquiry, can miss important elements 
when incorporated uncritically. On the island, additional categories of difference deeply 
impact access to resources and quality of everyday life, for example, a) town of origin, as 
the Lampedusani are a protective and tight-knit community that firmly regards long-term 
residents born elsewhere as outsiders; this aspect is additionally complicated by 
island/mainland divides and by regional tensions prevalent across Italy, but especially 
pronounced in North/South dichotomies; b) legal status, as mobility is tightly controlled to 
contain irregular flows into Europe, with a resulting securitization of public spaces and 
points of departure; c) occupation, as the residents that own businesses in the tourism 
industry control a vital component of the economic life on the island, while other 
Lampedusani live in conditions of economic precarity and limited mobility.  
Though it is true that these locally-specific divisions deserve attention in this 
inquiry, in Lampedusa much like anywhere else, gender, race and class decidedly shape 
experiences and mobility. The majority of migrants arriving to Lampedusa are men, which 
fuels the narratives on invasion based on the fetishization of men from the Global South 
and the MENA region as violent, culturally conservative and not likely to integrate into 
European societies (Kofman 2018, Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013, Mahler and 
Pessar 2006). Additionally, when women do reach the island on boats departing Tunisia or 
Libya, they are at increased risk for sexual exploitation and violence. Women in the 
resident population are also faced with important challenges; according to ISTAT data, the 
 
  15 
rate of female employment in Lampedusa is 22.3%, 1.7% lower than regional average, and 
13.8% lower than national average (2011). For residents, class massively impacts mobility, 
which in turn determines the ability to access important services that are not offered on the 
island, which include pre-natal care, chemotherapy and the driving exam to obtain a 
motorcycle license.  
Finally, in Lampedusa like in the rest of Italy, the conversation around race is 
incredibly complex and in in some ways evaded and obscured through the discussion of 
place of origin, culture and language (De Genova, 2013). For much of the country’s history, 
popular discourses and government strategies have framed southern populations as 
racialized and orientalized others, falling behind national average in terms of education and 
development (Giglioli 2017). In Italy, the categories of “southern” and “northern” are 
embedded with racialized scripts, notions of economic dependence/superiority, and 
standards of cultural legitimacy. These internal divisions have been central points of 
tension in national debates, as the history of Salvini’s League party shows. Though today 
the party goes by The League, up until 2017 its official name was Lega Nord (The North 
League), a party that outwardly campaigned for the independence of Northern Italy (Fatto 
Quotidiano 2017). It is telling that the League, in presenting itself as a “planetary” 
movement (Lega Nord, 2019), has moved away from its original separatist platform to 
focus on immigration from the Global South. The framing of Mediterranean migration 
dissimulates racism and racial discrimination through nativist narratives that discuss 
migrant difference in terms of culture and identity (De Genova, 2013). The categories of 
“migrant” and “foreigner” reproduce colonial divisions while muting the memory of Italian 
and European colonialism, ultimately reinforcing white, euro-centric hegemony.   
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In analyzing the interventions and experiences of the residents of Lampedusa with 
bordering and the daily construction of hierarchies of difference, I emphasize that 
individuals can simultaneously be oppressors and oppressed (Dahmoon 2011:235). The 
residents can both suffer the painful effects of the externalization of migration enforcement 
by mainland actors and potentially contribute to the detention, discrimination and 
marginalization of migrants and asylum seekers. In this sense, I seek to construct an 
approach that does not relegate the island residents to the status of victims or oppressors, 
but rather looks at the dynamic role of individuals in the multifaceted apparatus of 
enforcement.  
Having discussed contributions in the field of feminist geopolitics, I now turn to 
critical border studies to situate my work within the discipline and explore emergent 
theoretical interventions on the study of borders. Here I ask: how can the study of political 
boundaries avoid engaging in what Agnew (1994) refers to as the “territorial trap?” This 
concept refers to the acceptance of the nation-state as a fixed, coherent, container of 
homogeneous culture, circumscribed by a hard border dividing domestic and foreign 
realms (Agnew 1994). Writings in critical border studies have problematized these 
romanticized notions of state boundaries as “lines in the sand.” Parker and Vaughan-
Williams evoke this metaphor (2009, 2012) in advancing a study of borders that decenters 
the boundary itself (2012:798), to explore the “bordering” processes that are constantly 
remaking, shifting and reproducing borders.  
This critique also posits that borders are increasingly diffused, with enforcement 
enacted far away from the edge of the state by a number of actors guided by complex 
rationales (Coleman 2008, Bigo 2004). Examples of this phenomenon range from boarding 
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checks in airports, where airline personnel perform the role of unofficial border agents, to 
the Secure Communities initiative in the USA which enables local and county jails to 
access federal immigration databases and report undocumented migrants to the 
immigration authorities (Coleman 2009). This expanding definition draws attention to 
borders as interfaces of connectivity and interaction found at multiple locations and sites.  
In problematizing the territorialist epistemologies that narrowly examine borders 
through the viewpoint of states, Rumford suggests that scholars need to “see like the 
border” (Johnson et al, 2011:67). This methodology encourages the incorporation of the 
diverse perspectives of those located at the sites where bordering is enacted, introducing 
more dynamic understandings based on material practices. The approach to border 
epistemology known as the “vernacularization of borders” decouples the study of bordering 
from a narrow focus on the territory, securitization and state politics to instead think about 
these processes as political resources, mobilized in the production of fear but also by 
ordinary people in contesting or redefining boundaries (Cooper et al. 2014).  
To examine these multiple and diverse engagements with borders, scholars 
including Jones, Johnson and Rumford have introduced the concept of “borderwork,” 
looking to actors crossing, staffing, monitoring, upholding, or resisting national boundaries 
(Rumford 2007, 2012, Jones and Johnson 2011, Johnson et al 2011). This line of inquiry 
has focused on ordinary people and groups including refugees, NGO workers and other 
humanitarian agents (Stierl 2015), and as it is the case with this thesis, on the experiences 
of those living at the border (Miggelbrink 2014, Norman 2014). Rather than understanding 
bordering on Lampedusa as uniquely determined by state control over national territory, 
the “borderwork” approach recognizes that the actions of both citizens and non-citizens are 
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not just driven by geopolitical preoccupations, but also by opportunism, activist aims, and 
goals of self-empowerment. Furthermore, this lens enables an analysis of both official and 
unofficial practices, introducing information about the material realities of bordering that 
might otherwise remain undetected.  
II. A Spatial Approach: Relationality 
In my thesis, I connect these processual understanding of borders and geopolitics 
to the conceptualization of space advanced by feminist geographer Doreen Massey (1994, 
2005) to theorize the relational nature of borders across space and time. In For Space 
Massey deconstructs the persistent but artificial division between local  
place and global space, to instead argue for the relationality of space (2005:66-67). Massey 
explains that globalization as we know it is aspatial and in open contradiction with the 
nature of space itself. Massey explains that the neoliberal narrative of globalization that 
has taken the center stage since WWII emphasizes the creation of new and meaningful 
connections in the global space between local places, with the difference in scale between 
the global and the local constantly emphasized. The local is then misconstrued as a 
coherent, homogeneous unit, and the global is discussed as a newly established scale, 
opening up opportunities for exchange and interactions that were never possible before 
(66-67). Such an approach fails to recognize the fundamental relationality of space, a space 
that is cannot be neatly divided up into bounded units, but is rather alive, constantly 
shifting, the coming together of a “bundle of trajectories” (2005:199). In adopting this 
theoretical framework, I emphasize that not just the border itself, but also spaces and 
experiences of everyday life on the island of Lampedusa are very much alive, and 
constantly shifting and being redefined as the product of interactions between a myriad of 
actors.  
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Though the production of space has been the topic of lively philosophical inquiry 
sparked by Lefebvre (1977), in this project, the decision to incorporate the theorization of 
space put forth by Doreen Massey is largely related to her critical, feminist approach. 
Massey not only explains how space is systematically mischaracterized and rendered static, 
but she also reveals how artificial divisions between space/place and local/global ultimately 
embolden the Western neoliberal agenda. In her work, Massey also emphasizes the 
gendered and racialized nature of spaces, causing them to be read and experienced 
differently by actors depending of their position in hierarchies of difference (1994). It is 
this focus to spatial experiences across difference that I seek to incorporate in discussing 
mobility on the island of Lampedusa, at once a site of protracted detention for migrants 
and a popular tourist destination enthusiastically welcoming crowds of tourists in the 
summer months, where a number of different registers of mobility emerge.  
I argue that Massey’s framework is especially suited to this research, as the border 
is a fundamental feature in upholding the mischaracterizations of space and place because 
it represents “the inscription of a place in space” (Agier 2016:18). There are clear 
connections between what Massey identifies as a systematic and deliberate misconstruction 
of space that serves the interests of Western capitalist hegemony, and the territorialist 
epistemologies that uphold a conceptualization of the border as a static line of meaningful 
difference. If this is generally true of borders, this erroneous conceptualization of space is 
especially familiar in discussions about islands, as “at first glance, few geographic entities 
seem more distinct and uncontestable than islands” (Steinberg, 2005:254).  
In contributing to an expanding body of work that applies the lens of relationality 
to the study of borders (Raeymaekers 2014, Mountz 2011), I analyze border spaces and 
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practices as the product of social relations. This approach reframes the state as only one of 
multiple “intertwined open-ended trajectories,” (Massey, 2005:113), which is in itself 
influenced and shaped by interactions with other actors. Such a conceptualization of border 
spaces as always in-the-making destabilizes the inevitability and perceived immutability 
of these divisions, to bring to the forefront the multiplicity of space and the opportunity for 
transformative change.  
III. Migration Management in Italy and Fortress Europe 
In this section, I will first contextualize the management and representation of 
migration in Lampedusa within larger trends in the European Union and in Italy. Then, I 
explore three dynamics discussed in the literature on global migration management: 
securitization, externalization, and humanitarianism. I summarize these patterns at the 
national and supra-national level to further contextualize the “borderwork” carried out by 
the residents. In later chapters, I reflect on how the experiences and interventions of 
residents are both co-constituted by and co-constituting conventional geopolitics.  
In the 1990s, the EU-member states agreed on the Schengen protocol with the aim 
of removing barriers to the internal flow of people and goods, guided by a cosmopolitan 
ethos. However, the increased inclusion of partners depended on the exclusion of non-
member neighbors, including those located in the Southern Mediterranean and at the 
Eastern frontier. This exclusion is achieved through the establishment of strict visa 
requirements and the progressive shrinking of opportunities for legal entry for citizens of 
non-member states. The approach to extra-communitarian migration, that is all migration 
from outside the EU and its 28 member states, prioritizes deterrence and information-
sharing, both facilitated by the application of new technologies (Mountz and Loyd 2014; 
Lopez-Sala 2015, Jones 2016).  
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As a result of the increasingly exclusionary standards for entry and due to a 
combination of natural geographic proximity and strategic externalization, a number of 
routes and border communities became increasingly associated with “clandestine 
migration.” At the Southern Frontier, these include the Spanish settlements of Ceuta and 
Melilla, the small island nation of Malta, the Greek island of Lesbos, and Lampedusa (De 
Genova 2017, Lutterback 2009, Scott et al 2018).  
While concerns relating to migration date back to the inception of Schengen in 1985 
(European Commission, 2019b), since the early 2010s, discussion of migratory flows has 
decidedly taken on the language and tone of “crisis.” In 2011, the revolutionary ripple of 
the Arab Spring, set off by the self-immolation of a fruit vendor in Tunisia, brought unrest 
to many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Coupled with sustained economic 
inequality, high unemployment rates and limited freedom of expression, these 
circumstances led to human displacement, both regionally and internationally. In 2011, 
Lampedusa alone saw an estimated 51,753 arrivals (Cuttitta, 2012:26). As a result of a 
decade of “emergency” narratives focused on the Southern Frontier, tensions are growing 
between EU member states. In 2018 and early 2019, these tensions materialized in a series 
of standoffs when Matteo Salvini denied authorization to disembark to a number of rescue 
vessels, arguing that rest of Europe also had to do its part to contribute to migrant 
resettlement (Tondo 2018, France24 2019, Ruta 2019).  
Scholars have importantly pointed to the political consequences of the adoption of 
a crisis narrative. Some have challenged the notion that there is an ongoing “emergency,” 
by highlighting that the overcrowding of reception facilities and the backlog of cases 
awaiting administrative evaluation is partially produced by the deliberate concentration of 
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bordering and detention and by a cumbersome bureaucratic process (Cuttitta, 2012). 
Others, including Mountz and Loyd (2018) have drawn attention to the crisis justification 
in arguing that it is at these moments that long-term legislative and enforcement changes 
are enacted and approved (De Genova 2017).  
Additionally, scholars in critical border studies have examined the border spectacle 
that is generated to supply evidence of the crisis at the southern frontier (De Genova 2013, 
2017; Musaró 2017; Cuttitta 2012, Van Reekum 2016). As a popular and highly-
recognizable geography of border enforcement, Lampedusa has often been featured in 
literature on border spectacle, assessing how the representation of “obscene migrant 
inclusion” (De Genova, 2013:) at the nation’s edge goes on to produce “a constant 
redundancy” (2013:2) of images and ideas that shape public opinion and political action. 
Though the literature on spectacle has been critiqued for maintaining a Euro-centric and 
top-down view of border imaginaries (Scott et al. 2018), this line of scholarship importantly 
draws attention to EU and state politics of in/visibility.  
Having provided an overview of the migratory phenomenon and debate around the 
Southern border of the European Union, I now turn to the three inter-connected strategies 
of migration management at play in Lampedusa: securitization, externalization and 
humanitarianism. 
a) Securitization: Island of Militarization  
The concept of securitization refers to the inclusion of migration and asylum policy 
in the framework of national security, a process that is often coupled with the 
criminalization of certain groups of migrants recognized by the state as “illegitimate” 
(Huysman 2006, Cacho 2012). This allows for the application of tactics and technologies 
associated with military operations to the governing of human mobility (Hyndman 2012). 
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While securitization caused a significant increase in border militarization and monitoring, 
such a shift is also connected to the increase in border policing away from the edge of the 
state, as a security response is triggered by the migrant body and deployed outside of 
traditional enforcement settings. As Mountz explains, these changes in political and 
popular discourses and legislation also produced exclusionary material geographies 
(Mountz, 2015:185), embedding the fear of detection and detention into an everyday life 
of surveillance.  
European states have long based their approach to immigration in national defense, 
justifying tough policy responses on the basis of a crisis backdrop that has become the 
norm. The construction of the complex regime of securitization of “Fortress Europe” dates 
back to the 1970s and 1980s, when the issue of migration become the subject of “policy 
debates about the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability” 
(Huysman 2000). As migration was framed as an obstacle to cultural integration and the 
successful operation of the welfare state, policy became the instrument to address these 
security concerns, along with the strengthening of collaboration between agents of 
enforcement across member states (Benyon, 1994). In Europe as in the United States, the 
link between migration and national security became much more pronounced and 
transparent after the attack on the World Trade Center in 9/11 (Huysmans 2006).   
At times of “emergency” the state mobilizes the threat to national security in 
justifying increased deployment of military resources, worsening human rights conditions, 
and reduced access to advocacy resources for migrants (Mountz 2011, Zaiotti 2016, 
Walters 2011). As Huysmans writes, “insecurity is a politically and socially constructed 
phenomenon” (2006:2). The association of migration to security concerns is 
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heterogeneous, varying in nature and magnitude from fear of loss of cultural identity and 
national tradition, to economic panic in the face of austerity and weakening welfare 
provisions, to anxiety over hypothetical terrorist threats. As theorist Didier Bigo explains, 
this heterogeneity contributes to management across different professions, creating a 
complex system of experts contributing to “regimes of truth” establishing what are the 
legitimate sources for unease (Bigo, 2008:8). In this sense, the state is reliant on specialized 
knowledge to assess potential threats, provide novel policing technologies, and aid in 
delineating new national security priorities.  
In Italy, the first legislation towards the securitization of migration is the Legge 
Martelli, passed in 1990. The decree established limits on economic migration, and 
delineated penal procedures for expulsion of “socially dangerous and irregular migrants” 
(Casella, 2016). Since 1990, the legislation on the subject of immigration has taken an 
increasingly securitarian approach in dealing with undocumented migration: in 1998, the 
Legge Turco-Napolitano established Centers for Temporary Stay (CPT), which would be 
renamed Centers for Identification and Expulsion (CIE) in 2009. Additionally, between 
2002 and 2009, the Italian government tested and expanded the “reato di clandestinitá,” the 
crime of illegal entry and stay, along with establishing charges for those favoring 
clandestine migration by hiring undocumented migrants, and integrating biometric 
technologies (Casella, 2016). These migration management provisions came under the 
scrutiny of human rights advocates and legal experts due to long detention periods and 
violations of EU directives in applying harsh law enforcement responses to human 
mobility. The “police view” of immigration also significantly constraints the possibilities 
and areas of collaboration between states. In the case of Italy, controversial arrangements 
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with Libya are aimed at curtailing “illegal” immigration, rather than addressing the human 
rights abuses that people are fleeing from, in a framework that places culpability on the 
figures of the migrant and the smuggler.  
The European Union as a whole began to pursue migration management through 
the lens of security. In 2004, the EU created Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (European Union, 2019). The new body, headquartered in Warsaw, was tasked 
with creating an integrated EU approach to border control. Since its creation, the agency 
has witnessed a continuous expansion of its powers and of the Schengen area itself, which 
now includes 44.000 km of sea borders. The most recent budget boost will bring Frontex’ 
workforce to 1000 by 2020 (DW 2018). According to Frontex’ official website, the agency 
collaborates with law enforcement, and focuses on preventing “smuggling, human 
trafficking and terrorism as well as many other cross-border crimes” (Frontex, 2019). 
However, Frontex also assists with humanitarian operations and asylum claims, a feature 
which locates the agency in both the security and humanitarian realm, blurring the line 
between the two. I will further explore the nexus between security and humanitarianism 
later on in this chapter, and at length throughout the thesis.     
Literature in feminist geopolitics has challenged the very premise of policies of 
securitization by asking who, if anyone at all, is made safer by these measures and how 
(Massaro and Williams 2013, Hyndman 2001). Critiques of securitization in the discipline 
specifically address the “banal,” intimate dimensions of such approaches to migration and 
public life more broadly (Christian et al 2016, Coleman 2009). Cindi Katz examines the 
production of fear through the routinized performance of security, acting as a constant 
reminder of the looming threat in our midst in an exercise of “banal terrorism” (2007, 
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Christian et al 2016). In Lampedusa, groups of agents roaming the streets in riot gear and 
habitual visits by high-ranking government officials are forms of what Katz refers to as 
“spatial fetishism” (2007:352), an essential element of the performance of emergency, and 
of the “bunkering of the Fortress state” (Katz, 2007:355). In applying findings from 
feminist geopolitics and critical migration studies to the study of securitization in 
Lampedusa, I explore the everyday dimensions of insecurity, and its effects on the lives of 
those living in the border town.  
I argue that Lampedusa, as growingly militarized border and stage of “obscene 
inclusion” of migrants (Di Genova 2013), is a key site in the production of insecurity at the 
national and international level. The residents of the island are importantly implicated in 
these processes; some outwardly reject media narratives of the island as “invaded” or “in 
chaos,” pushing back against the tale of perpetual emergency. Others rise in the ranks of 
specialized professionals, supplying descriptions of concerns and threats that come to 
shape securitization approaches. Having explained the strategy of securitization, I now look 
to the connected effort to externalize enforcement to a number of peripheral locations.  
b) Externalization: Island of Detention 
Though the push for securitization brought policing to public life across the 
European Union, the operations of initial processing and detention are routinely 
externalized to a number of strategically-positioned locations, able to filter access to EU 
territory and stop migrants before they reach their destination. With the intensification of 
crisis refrains, states and supranational agencies have justified extensions of enforcement 
powers outside of their sovereign territory and the creation of hybrid jurisdictions as means 
to address a growing emergency (Mountz 2011, Zaiotti 2016, Casas-Cortez et al 2015). 
Attempts at externalizing border and migration management are complex, often reliant on 
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collaboration between receiving and sending countries, the intervention of NGOs, and an 
increasingly complex technology apparatus. As Mountz argues, one of the effects of 
externalization is the progressive shrinking of the geographies of asylum, as economic 
migrants and asylum seekers alike are intercepted and detained in areas characterized by 
liminal sovereignty, far from administrative authorities, advocates, and media (2011). This 
creates a barrier to presenting asylum claims and requesting official hearings or status 
determination procedures and can leave detainees in a liminal state, neither here, nor there.  
These practices have been the subject of criticism in relation to the imposition of sovereign 
priorities on foreign and remote territories, and the association of externalization with 
human rights abuses and hybrid status.  
Along with establishing Frontex to carry out enforcement operations at the border, 
the European Union externalization strategy materialized in the “Hotspot Approach.” The 
Hotspot approach is first introduced by the European Commission in 2015, as “a means of 
providing emergency assistance to frontline Member States that were faced with the arrival 
of disproportionate numbers of migrants” (Mentzelopoulou and Luyten, 2018:1). The 
proposal indicated facilities of first reception and identification, five in Italy and five in 
Greece, where EU officials would assist local authorities in coordinating aid and 
management. Lampedusa’s center is one of these facilities of externalized EU control. Six 
of the hotspots are located on minor islands, with three located on a major one (Sicily) and 
only one on the mainland (in Taranto, Italy). 
It should be noted that in the context of EU policy, the country of Italy itself is a 
site of externalization, as one of the member-states at the southern frontier insulating the 
rest of the Union from arrivals (De Genova, 2017). The European Union governs asylum 
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through the Dublin Regulation, first signed in 1990; the current iteration, Dublin III 
(Regulation 604/2013), came into effect in 2014. The agreement establishes that the state 
of first entry in the EU is responsible for the processing of the asylum application 
(European Commission, 2019a). As a result, border states including Italy, Greece and 
Spain are responsible for the processing of the vast majority of maritime arrivals.  
In Italy, externalization unfolds in three geographies: a) at the state’s periphery, as 
it is the case with Lampedusa b) at high seas, through maritime monitoring (Musarò 2016, 
Garelli and Tazzioli 2018) c) in the sending country, through the funding of local coast 
guards and detention facilities (Bialasiewicz 2012). Though the three remain 
interconnected and it is common for all of these externalization strategies to be 
implemented contemporaneously, emphasis on individual approaches is largely 
determined by the position of the ruling party in immigration policy. Here, I focus on 
externalization on islands, a project that bears colonial roots and has been central to the 
Italian migration management strategy. While I recognize that island externalization is a 
part of the logic of the securitization, I argue that in analyzing this particular management 
strategy, scholarship should integrate findings in island studies and postcolonial critique in 
order to highlight a long history of problematic island/mainland relationships and link it to 
current practices.  
In the field of island studies, scholars have examined the history of islands as 
“novelty sites” (Baldacchino, 2007), laboratories for testing of theories, practices and 
techniques often originating from the mainland. This phenomenon stems from 
romanticized and essentializing notions of islands as tabula rasa and as bounded spaces 
(Baldacchino 2007, Steinberg 2005, Nadarajah and Grydehøj 2016). These imaginaries 
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have informed a use of islands as quarantine sites, penal colonies, military compounds, 
tropical tourist paradises, and more, driven by mainland priorities. The field of nissology, 
described by McCall as the study of islands on their own terms (1996), proposes an 
approach that does not engage in familiar island tropes focusing on minute size and 
remoteness, but rather centers islanders and their unique perspectives (Baldacchino 2008). 
This research project focuses on the experiences and perspectives of the residents of 
Lampedusa in the discussion of externalization. Understanding that there is a history of 
imposition of mainland interests on islands, this project aligns with scholarship proposing 
a more nuanced and relational approach to island-mainland and archipelagic relations 
(Nadarajah and Grydehøj 2016, Mountz 2015). 
This relational thinking is foundational to the concept of “enforcement 
archipelago,” introduced by Mountz to reflect on the role of islands such as Lampedusa in 
the regime of border enforcement (2011). This term refers to the global system of island 
detention that excludes both migrants and refugees from reaching sovereign territory, 
where they can make a claim (Mountz, 2011:128). Mountz suggests that by analyzing the 
history of islands as connected, it is possible to identify the spatial patterns that make island 
detention an established and systematic state tactic, far from an improvised emergency 
measure (2011:121). Factors that make island preferred sites of detention at the eyes of the 
state include physical geography, but also legal ambiguity and the “persistent 
reconfiguration of sovereignty” (Loyd and Mountz, 2014). An example of this is the 
Australian “power of excision,” which declared a specific territory to be outside of the 
bounds of national sovereignty for the purposes of immigration and asylum (Mountz, 
2011:124). The approach of the Italian government to Lampedusa is somewhat similar, as 
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the border is there conceptualized as a zone rather than a line (Cuttitta, 2014:205). Migrants 
that arrive in Lampedusa are “refused entry” rather than expelled, even though they are 
already on Italian territory. Additionally, far removed from central governing bodies and 
administrative authorities, the migration control apparatus in Lampedusa represents a 
liminal legal space, where violations are rarely addressed, and migrants live in a state of 
exception (Dines et al. 2015). Here, I seek to investigate how this state of liminality shapes 
daily life in Lampedusa, as well as connections between the local population and mainland 
Italy.  
I aim to further contextualize the “frontierization” (Cuttitta, 2012) of Lampedusa 
through the experiences of residents who have witnessed the d/evolution of the island as 
site of EU and Italian externalization of migration management. Lampedusa’s role as a site 
of externalization became pronounced in 1998, with the establishment of the first formal 
on-site facility for migrant detention, and it intensified into the early 2010s, with increases 
in arrivals and maritime interceptions. However, administrative inefficiency combined 
with insufficient capacity in the reception/detention center caused the island itself to 
become the space of detention. These moments are characterized by high tensions with the 
residents, who see their lives disrupted. In Chapter IV, I will discuss one such instance in 
the Spring of 2011, when the Italian government refused to authorize the transfer of an 
estimated 6000 migrants held on the island, turning the entirety of Lampedusa into a site 
of temporary detention and externalization.  
c) Humanitarianism: Island of Welcome 
Shrinking options for legal entry, the integration of defense strategies and 
technologies into migration management and the continued externalization of bordering to 
remote locations at the edge of the nation state all contributed to an increase in violence 
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and fatalities in border spaces. This is especially true in the case of the Mediterranean 
frontier and of the Central Mediterranean Route in which Lampedusa is inserted, widely 
considered to be among the deadliest in the world (Ferrer-Gallardo and Van Houtum 2014, 
Jones 2016, Heller and Pezzani 2014). According to the IOM’s Missing Migrant Project, 
33,761 people were reported to have died or gone missing in the Mediterranean between 
2000 and June of 2017 (IOM, 2017). In 2018 alone, Italy saw a total of 23,370 sea arrivals, 
with 1,311 people were reported dead or missing in the crossing (UNHCR, 2019). In the 
face of growing criticism, liberal democracies across Europe have responded by deploying 
a number of humanitarian initiatives, intensifying an approach that has been applied in 
legitimizing hardening migration policies for decades (Mezzadra and Nielsen 2013, 
Vaughn-Williams 2015).  
Humanitarianism, anchored in moral values and stated benevolence, prioritizes 
individual bodily health and integrity rather than longer-term and more transformative 
interventions to address the political and historical circumstances that produce the need for 
care. In examining the history of “humanitarian reason,” Fassin explains that earlier 
expressions of this approach in the French context saw the state delineate “discretionary 
exemptions” to deportation proceedings and barriers to entry for migrants suffering from a 
serious illness, an indication of benevolence from a country that was contemporaneously 
working to restrict entry for those suffering from poverty and hunger (Fassin, 2012:88). In 
describing how this model is applied to the contemporary Mediterranean situation, van 
Reekum writes “migrants acquire the right to be saved once shipwrecked” (Van Reekum, 
2016:338) Scholarship on humanitarianism (Ticktin 2011, 2016, Walters 2011, Hyndman 
2000) has advanced a number of critiques of approaches to migrant suffering that are 
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exceptional and dehistoricized in nature and that combine emotional and biological 
registries to assess migrant deservingness.  
The humanitarian mission depends on recognition through a system of experts 
including doctors and NGO operators, one that targets certain forms of suffering while 
disregarding others and demands an embodied performance of suffering readable by the 
state apparatus. This also frames specific bodies as chronically sick, wounded or violated, 
victims to be rescued. Ticktin argues that the regimes of care activated by “the morally 
legitimate suffering body” (2011:3) seek to provide “immediate, urgent, and temporary 
care […] in the name of political neutrality” (2011:63). In doing so, rather than addressing 
the political and social conditions at the root of humanitarian emergencies, the focus in 
placed on the dehistoricized and feminized migrant body. As Ticktin goes on to explain, 
this type of humanitarianism is far from a depoliticized moral calling; instead, it is 
inherently political, framing the state as a benevolent actor and obscuring its hand in 
contributing to violence (2011, 2016). 
Writing about the Mediterranean context, scholars have further problematized 
regimes of rescue by exploring the humanitarian-security nexus (Garelli et al 2018, 
Andersson 2017). Foundational to the critique is that the dual humanitarian/security 
“crisis” ongoing in the Mediterranean is the result of the production of the Mediterranean 
as the sole route for those seeking to enter Europe (Garelli et at. 2018). Beyond state 
involvement in the manufacturing and perpetuating of crisis, literature on the nexus points 
to the fact that humanitarian response itself has become increasingly connected to the 
military apparatus. An example of this is Operation Mare Nostrum, launched by the Italian 
Navy in October 2013. The military-humanitarian mission was a response to two deadly 
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shipwrecks, both associated with the island of Lampedusa. In the span of one week in the 
October of 2013 an estimated 636 lives were lost: 368 on October 3rd, just half a mile off 
the coast of Lampedusa, and 268 on October 11th, approximately 60 miles from the Italian 
island (Gatti 2013, Rubino 2013).  
The strengthening of the humanitarian-security nexus has contributed to the 
framing of the Mediterranean as a “humanitarian battlefield” (Musaró, 2016:5), and to the 
routinized depiction of a number of essentialized key players including soldiers as “nurses 
with guns” (Musaró, 2016:9), smugglers as antagonized criminal actors (Musaró 2016, 
Garelli and Tazzioli 2018, Mountz 2011), suffering migrant as deserving victims. Migrants 
who do not meet the expectations for model victimhood are instead framed as “bogus 
refugees” or “bogus economic migrants” (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013, Heller and Pezzani 
2016, Ashutosh and Mountz, 2012) to be apprehended and repatriated. 
Humanitarianism is not independent from securitization; instead, the presence of 
human trafficking and the increase in fatalities become the justification to increase military 
presence and expand the power of enforcement personnel to face what is depicted as a 
short-term emergency, in spite of more long-term interventions addressing the conditions 
that cause mass displacement, and the lack of safe avenues for migration. As Tazzioli 
argues, the expansion of humanitarian logic also allowed the expansion of the sea as space 
of governmentality, normalizing routine intervention outside of territorial waters and into 
the high seas (2016). In doing so, humanitarianism also harbors new opportunities for 
externalization.  
Lampedusa, along with being a site of externalization and securitization, is an 
indispensable site in the Italian and EU regime of humanitarianism. In the past two decades, 
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the island has served as an operating center for organizations including, but not limited to 
the UNHCR, IOM, Save the Children, Red Cross International, and the Sovereign Military 
Order of Malta. Beyond its strategic importance, Lampedusa also become a highly visible 
site for the representation of the Mediterranean as humanitarian battlefield. In inserting this 
project in the larger discussion on humanitarian politics in the Mediterranean, I do not 
intend to minimize the services and support provided, which have undoubtedly proven to 
be lifesaving for migrants in conditions of extreme suffering. Instead, I incorporate 
critiques of humanitarianism to assess how these operations are connected to wider 
enforcement strategies in the context of Lampedusa, and how humanitarianism may be 
involved in obscuring an increase in militarization. I align myself with Ticktin by rejecting 
a dehistoricized and depoliticized understanding of human suffering at the border. In 
chapter IV, I connect the rise of a humanitarian regime to a complex web of enforcement 
strategies, and to the colonial past and present of the island. In chapter V, I analyze the 
spectacularization of island spaces to highlight how island residents have interacted with 
the framing of Lampedusa as island of solidarity and site of humanitarian emergency.   
IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have contextualized the aims and guiding epistemologies of this 
project within scholarship in feminist geopolitics, critical border studies, and spatial theory. 
Having explained how these approaches enable a dynamic and relational understanding of 
bordering on the island of Lampedusa, I have then provided an overview of the unfolding 
migratory phenomenon in Europe, connecting it with three interdependent strategies of 
border management: securitization, externalization, and humanitarianism. In upcoming 
chapters, I showcase how these processes are at work in Lampedusa, first by tracing their 
history through resident perspectives, and then by looking at how these diverse approaches 
 
  35 
to bordering are manifested and contested in island spaces, highlighting their processual 
nature and continuous construction. Now that I have laid out the conceptual framework at 
the foundation of this project, in Chapter III I explain the methods employed in conducting 
this ethnographic study.   
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Chapter III: Methods 
 
My research interest in the daily practices of bordering in Lampedusa informs the 
decision to carry out ethnographic work. In the field of geography, ethnography has 
become an established "intersubjective form of qualitative research" (Watson and Till, 
2010) aiming at better understanding a group and its interactions with the environment 
through participant observation and interaction (Herbert, 2000). Ethnographic studies 
connect what participants say to what they do, and how they interpret and make sense of 
geopolitical processes shaping their everyday life. A popular approach in both feminist 
geopolitics and critical border studies, ethnography had for long remained an 
underexplored method in political geography which favored the analysis of elite practices 
and discourses (Megoran 2006, Herbert 2000, Crang 2002).  With its immersive nature, 
ethnography can help create connections, on one hand familiarizing the researcher with 
lived experiences, while also giving research participants an opportunity to play a more 
active role in the representation of their narrative (McDowell, 1992, 2016). To this end, I 
spent 6 weeks in Lampedusa doing fieldwork, from May 20th to June 30th, 2018.  
I combined an analysis of archival research with participant observation, and in-
depth interviews. I explain how each method is suited to the analysis of borderwork by the 
residents of Lampedusa and begin to explore the limits of these approaches emergent from 
both academic literature and my own experience carrying out international fieldwork. 
Finally, I address my own positionality as researcher, as an Italian woman living in the 
United States and as a mainlander, to critically reflect on how these identities both inform 
my analysis and shape interactions in the field. 
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I. Archival Research  
A Berlin Golden-Bear-winning documentary film, at least a dozen books and 
thousands of news articles across both international and Italian media platforms: the body 
of material written on or about Lampedusa has grown exponentially over the last decade, 
as the island became increasingly prominent in the collective imagination as 
quintessentially “border” (Cuttitta 2012, 2014). Because in this project I set out to 
investigate how bordering shapes daily life in Lampedusa through both material and 
symbolic processes, I compiled a digital archive of content from and about Lampedusa.  
In analyzing this wide array of documents from disparate sources I consider the 
critique that secondary data emerges from the work of organizations and individuals with 
diverse ideologies and motivations for publishing content (Hodder 2003, White 2010). 
Therefore, I critically approach this material in order to form a more complex 
understanding of the research field, maintaining a focus on knowledge originating from the 
residents rather than about the island. Feminist geographer Linda McDowell explains that 
in conducting and analyzing interviews, social scientists can introduce visual artifacts, 
news articles, and secondary data to contextualize findings and conversations with 
participants (2010:158).  
In collecting stories about the island, I intended to both map patterns and themes of 
representation and gather information about events unfolding there, which would inform 
interview questions and research design. The tools that enabled this method of data 
collection include Google Trends, showing interest over time and topics related to a given 
search, the database LexisNexis, through which I searched and organized documents, and 
the online historical archive of the Italian newspaper il Corriere della Sera, collecting all 
articles published by the source since 1876. Lastly, I draw from official data on island 
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demography and economics, and on Mediterranean migration. Sources include the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), the Italian Ministry of the Interior, the National 
Authority for Civil Aviation (ENAC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).  
Lampedusa, a rapidly growing tourist economy with a history of emigration, was 
featured in news coverage in international outlets including (but not limited to) the BBC, 
the Guardian, the New York Times, der Spiegel and le Monde. Across the Italian media 
landscape, pieces on the island are ubiquitous, from references and full features in famous 
newspapers like La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera, to independent media and blogs. 
If international interest in Lampedusa was overwhelmingly connected to the migratory 
phenomenon, Google Trend data about searches within Italy evidences that interest follows 
a cyclical pattern peaking in the summer months, with many tourism-related queries. After 
an initial spike in international and domestic interest in the March of 2011 during the Arab 
Spring, coverage reaches an all-time high in the weeks following the fall 2013 shipwrecks. 
This analysis of media pieces also highlighted a number of players amongst residents, 
recurring as sources and authors; these include former-mayor Giusi Nicolini and current 
mayor Totó Martello, Pietro Bartolo, also known as “the migrant doctor” and author of 
international bestseller Tears of Salt, and outspoken activist Giacomo Sferlazzo and the 
Askavusa Collective. Content analysis of secondary sources also aided me in discussion 
with island resident, who are keenly aware of the growing interest in the island and 
frequently reference specific pieces or claims in their critiques and/or endorsements.  
II. Participant Observation 
Participant observation is a qualitative research method that consists in the 
researcher visiting the research field to "experience and observe at first hand a range of 
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dimensions in and of that setting" (Mason, 2002). Participant observation proves useful in 
both forming networks in the field and exploring the interaction between people and the 
environment (Watson and Till 2010, Lauriel 2010). In selecting and applying this method, 
I am not suggesting that the experiences of those living at the border can be understood or 
captured by an outsider simply through observation and brief engagement. However, in 
conjunction with interviews, participant observation provides insights on daily life and 
interactions as they are routinely enacted across space.  
While planning my stay on the island, I decided against connecting with 
humanitarian organizations or other outside groups to limit affiliations that might hinder or 
affect interactions with island residents. Instead, I stayed in a residence just outside of town, 
in the Cala Creta area. The family managing the residence became gracious and friendly 
hosts as well as important gatekeepers. During my stay on Lampedusa, I sought out 
opportunities to connect with residents and be engaged in public life by attending events 
including the reopening of the Archeologic Museum of the Pelagie, the unveiling of the 
“Mosaic of Humanity” Cross and participating in spiritual life on the island. Additionally, 
I conducted participant observation in via Roma, the center of Lampedusa’s economic 
activity and social life.  
I selected two sites along via Roma, one in Garibaldi Square and one on the 
Belvedere, and dedicated a minimum of two hours a day to participant observation [See 
Figure 2]. The Belvedere overlooks the harbor, where most public enforcement operations 
converge. Garibaldi Square, in front of Lampedusa’s Church of San Gerlando, is the largest 
in town and is a lively center of social encounter and conversation, drawing retirees chasing 
the shade and chatting on benches, children playing soccer, migrants and tourists alike in 
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search of Wi-Fi and street vendors who every summer populate the town center from 6 pm 
well into the night.  
Participant observation proved especially valuable in the recording of routine 
manifestations of the securitization of public spaces. These manifestations included the 
presence of patrols and specialized law enforcement vehicles and technologies, examples 
of the intimate and mundane dimension of international relations and politics that feminist 
geopolitics seeks to investigate. Additionally, through participant observation I aimed to 
build awareness and knowledge of the local context that informs a more grounded analysis, 
mindful of cultural specificity.  
 
Furthermore, it is through participant observation that I was repeatedly confronted 
with the contrast between the images and representations of Lampedusa that I had collected 
prior to reaching the field, and the experience of daily life on the island that I was recording. 
Though the compiling of a news and media archive of Lampedusa show an enduring 
connection between images and representations of the Mediterranean island and the 
Figure 2: Map of participant observation sites  
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migrant “crisis”, these were in many ways dissonant with what many participants referred 
to as Lampedusa’s trademark “tranquility.” This contradiction between the national 
imagination of Lampedusa and lived experiences is one that commonly played out in 
reaction and comments made by tourists confused by how “ordinary” Lampedusa seems, 
and that later became a focal point of interviews with island residents.  
III. In-Depth Semi-Structured Interviews 
Qualitative interviews are central to the aim of understanding how island residents 
both experience bordering and are themselves implicated in geopolitical processes. Though 
there is a sustained production of content and literature about Lampedusa as evidenced by 
the expansive media and government sources here considered, the role of the residents in 
the narrative is often as witnesses of geopolitics rather than actors implicated in geopolitical 
processes.  As McDowell writes, the aim of qualitative interviews “is to explore and 
understand actions within specific settings, to examine human relationships and discover 
as much as possible about why people feel or act in the ways they do” (in DeLyser et al 
2010:158). Semi-structured interviews are conversational and informal in character 
(Longhurst 2010) and aimed at capturing a wide array of experiences and perspectives.   
I conducted 16 in-depth semi-structured interviews with island residents, seven 
women and nine men, ranging in age between 27 and 69. All but one of the respondents 
are Italian citizens, the exception being Andrea, a young man originally from Sub-Saharan 
Africa who returns to Lampedusa yearly for seasonal employment. The eligibility 
requirements set for the study are the following: 
i. Participants must spend at least 6 months out of the year in Lampedusa.  
ii. Participants must have lived on the island for a period of at least 3 years.  
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These sampling choices were intended to ensure that the participants can be 
considered “residents” and that their experience of daily life on the island has developed 
over a prolonged period of time. Defining what I mean by “resident” is especially relevant 
to the context of Lampedusa, an island with a strong sense of community where most 
economic activity takes place between May and October, and where the winter months can 
be characterized by limited interaction with outsiders and access to resources from the 
mainland. I define three categories of residency status: 1) Native Resident, who claim the 
islander identity on the basis of family lineage, though they often were not born on the 
island due to the lack of a maternity ward; 2) Resident Outsiders, who relocated from 
elsewhere in Italy and live on island year-round, long-term, without claiming islander 
identity; 3) Transient Residents, who live on the island for a period of 6 months each year, 
leaving at the end of the tourist season and promptly returning when Lampedusa awakens 
in early May [Table 1].  
Initial recruitment took place on site through the distribution of flyers, leading to 
snowball sampling as interviewees connected me to eligible and interested residents. Prior 
to entering the field, I set out to create a diverse sample, intended to capture and represent 
a number of backgrounds, identities and life experiences on the island. This informs the 
participation of individuals with a diverse array of residence statuses, ideologies, ages and 
places of origin, within what is limited demographic diversity on the island. The sample 
size was limited by both the duration of the study and its timing, which coincided with the 
busiest time of the years for residents, when the island wakes up from its winter rest and 
prepares for long hours and a 7-day work week to serve the tourist crowds.   
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Table 1:Presentation of Interviewees 
Name Gender Age Resident Status Occupation 
Giovanni M 27 Native Resident Store cashier/manager 
Anna F Est. 40 Resident Outsider Store co-owner 
Cristina F 43 Resident Outsider Fruit stand employee 
(seasonal) 
Ruben M 42 Transient 
Residents 
Server 
Alecos M 67 Resident Outsider Retiree 
Sara F 56 Resident Outsider Store owner 
Andrea M 28 Transient 
Residents 
Server 
Marco M 34 Transient 
Residents 
Artisan street vendor 
Giacomo M 42 Native Resident Restaurant owner 
Assunta F 47 Native Resident Store owner/artist 
Leonardo M 29 Native Resident Waiter/tourism operator 
Stefania F 53 Native Resident Restaurant owner 
Angelo M 69 Resident Outsider Store owner 
Sofia F 55 Resident Outsider Store owner 
Elena F 27 Native Resident Store cashier (seasonal) 
Carlo M 63 Native Resident Boat owner/operator 
 
I conducted the in-depth semi-structured interviews in Italian, audio-recorded them 
with the permission of the participants and then transcribed them. Conversations ranged in 
duration from 35 to 75 minutes. Interview participants selected the time and location, with 
most interviews taking place in cafes, restaurants and stores. Asking the interviewee to pick 
a “familiar” location was a motivated by two considerations: on one hand, participants may 
feel more comfortable and inclined to openly discuss experiences (Longhurst, 2010:110, 
Valentine 2005). On the other hand, the act of picking a place can itself reveal more about 
the relationship of the respondents with social spaces on the island.  
Participants were assigned a pseudonym to protect their anonymity, and foster 
openness by limiting the potential for what Baldacchino refers to as “crab in the barrel 
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syndrome” (2008:45). This is a phenomenon that sees islanders who engage in disclosure 
with outsiders attacked or ridiculed by their peers for disclosing what are seen as internal 
matters. As Baldacchino explains, a common response to the fear of reprisal is that 
islanders can tend to engage in “soft-thematic” that are less likely to become sources of 
tension. Though pseudonyms do provide some level of protection, it is also true that in the 
close-knit island community where the presence and actions of outsiders are closely 
monitored, these might not suffice in creating participant anonymity, or in providing a 
comfortable environment for the disclosure of personal or controversial information. An 
additional consideration is that many island residents have experience with interviews, both 
with media outlets and researchers, which has not always been positive. I was confronted 
with this reality in one instance during the recruitment phase, when one individual told me 
that they were not interested in participating in any more interviews after their words were 
manipulated by a reporter.  
The interview was based on a standard set of questions on topics ranging from one’s 
daily routine and engagements within the island community, to media coverage of 
Lampedusa and the temporary closing of the migrant reception center. The flexibility of 
semi-structured interviews also allowed the participants to guide the conversation, often in 
unexpected ways. Three of the participants shared their own intimate experience with the 
Oct 3rd, 2013 shipwreck; Angelo and Sofia were two of eight people on the first boat to 
reach the wreckage and initiate rescue. Marco is the son of one of the other first responders. 
Carlo explains his role in the early days of tourism in Lampedusa in 1986, immediately 
after Libyan colonel Ghedaffi directed two missiles towards the NATO base that was then 
located on the island. It is this interactive potential that makes interviewing a foundational 
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methodology in the field of feminist geopolitics and that enables a more dynamic and 
situated understanding of bordering. 
IV. Positionality  
As Angrosino and Mays de Pérez write about ethnographic fieldwork, “interaction 
is always a tentative process that involves the continuous testing by all participants of the 
conceptions they have of the roles of others” (in Denzin and Lincoln, 2003:124). In 
approaching ethnographic studies, feminist researchers in the social sciences have 
highlighted the role of reflexivity and positionality, aimed at critically considering how the 
perspective and insider/outsider status of the researcher shape interactions in the field and 
become embedded in analysis and representation (DeLyser 2001, Cope 2002, Dreby 2015, 
Staeheli and Lawson 1995). In occupying a multitude of shifting positions and identities, 
researchers are both insiders and outsiders, observing and being observed. To further 
complicate this notion, I consider the critique leveraged by Gillian Rose, highlighting the 
methodological impossibility of transparent reflexivity, of squarely situating oneself within 
structures of power and oppression (1997:313). In this section, mindful of this limit to what 
is knowable, I begin to situate my position in the field and reflect how it shapes my 
approach to this project and participant interactions.  
As a researcher from an industrial, urban area in North Eastern Italy, I emphasize 
that shared nationality does not serve as the ground for the baseless assumption of shared 
cultural practices. In addition to regional differences which remain pronounced across Italy 
and are a product of diverse histories in a country of recent political invention, there is a 
painful history of internal colonialism and discrimination of Southern populations (Giglioli 
2017, Palumbo 2003). Additionally, my home region is well represented in the tourist 
crowds reaching Lampedusa each year; this pattern creates unique local dynamics and 
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connections and establishes a set of assumptions and expectations that I was often 
confronted with during my time in the field. People often believed that I was a tourist, 
recognizing the familiar accent. Others joked about the sense of superiority of northern 
Italians, asking me if I felt the same way and wondering why I would do research in 
Lampedusa.  
As a mainlander visiting and writing about an island, I also consider the problematic 
history of islands as the subject of the fetishized gaze of academics and governmental 
officials on the mainland (McGall 1996, Baldacchino 2004, Steinberg 2005). As a point of 
departure, nissologists advocate for island studies that are for, with and by the islanders, 
reclaiming the right to narrate life and events on islands for the locals (McGall 1996, 
Baldacchino 2008), an argument that motivates a research design centered around the 
individual experiences of the residents, and mindful of the often-problematic history of 
exploitation and asymmetrical power relationships between island and mainland.   
Not less importantly, the island of Lampedusa has been the subject of international 
media coverage, intensifying as the number of migrant arrivals rose.  In this sense, it is 
pivotal to recognize that the heightened humanitarian, governmental, and academic 
presence on the island has both proven to be an economic asset and a source of frustration 
for the local population. As a researcher affiliated with a faraway foreign university, I was 
at times confronted with the exasperation harbored by some residents who are weary of 
observers and cameras, but most importantly of Lampedusa being narrowly portrayed as a 
site of “migrant emergency.” Frequently, the reservations gave way to enthusiastic 
collaboration and enriching dialogue when I explained the nature of my project, though 
others maintained that they had given their fair share of interviews.  
 
  47 
V. Conclusion 
A conceptual framework centering the experiences and interventions of those living 
at the border informs the decision to carry out an ethnographic study. Ethnography is a 
method that allows for the analysis of processes and meanings as they are constructed 
through mundane interactions by those who experience the everyday dimensions of 
geopolitics. Though ethnography is a participatory and immersive methodology, I stress 
that in selecting this method I am not suggesting that the experiences of those living at the 
borders can be understood or captured by an outsider, simply through observation and brief 
engagement. Instead, interviews in conjunction with participant observation can provide 
insight on both the narratives of the locals and their actions in daily life across space. 
Having reviewed the epistemological and methodological foundations of this project, I now 
present empirical findings in two chapters, first providing historical context and resident 
perspectives on the hardening of the Mediterranean border to then look to space as an 
archive that showcases the multiple and contested nature of bordering.   
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Chapter IV: A Grassroot Genealogy of Bordering 
 
In Lo Spettacolo del Confine (the Spectacle of the Border), Cuttitta chronologically 
details national policies, practices and discourses contributing to what he defines as the 
“frontierization” of the island of Lampedusa (2012:73). Cuttitta explains that the common 
association of Lampedusa with bordering in public debates is not entirely based on a cliché; 
instead, it does reflect the fact that the island is “more a border” than any other frontier 
town in Italy. Cuttitta argues that to explain the role of the island in border spectacle, it is 
not enough to look to geography alone. Instead, we must look to the processes that 
constituted Lampedusa as the quintessential border over the last few decades, from 
relations between Italy and Mediterranean states including Tunisia and Libya, to the 
externalization of detention and increase in maritime monitoring.  
By including the perspectives of a sample of island residents on these processes, 
this project seeks to go beyond “the panoptic gaze implicit in border spectacles” (Scott et 
al., 2018:175), to see how discourses and practices are constructed through social 
interaction. In this chapter, I expand on Cuttitta’s argument by incorporating approaches 
in feminist geopolitics to contextualize and explore the intimate and mundane dimension 
of the “frontierization of Lampedusa.” Along with interview data, I heavily draw from “A 
Short History of Lampedusa” by island archivist Nino Taranto (2017) and the document 
“Lampedusa Istruzioni per l’uso” (Lampedusa Instructions for use) published by the 
Askavusa collective in 2018. I prioritize these sources center knowledge originating from 
the residents of Lampedusa. To document changes in migrant arrivals in Lampedusa over 
the last two decades, I compiled and summarized data published by the Department of the 
Interior [see Table 1]. 
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In crafting a genealogy of bordering through the perspective of island residents, I 
follow the critique of border studies advanced by Walters (2011, 2017) who advocates for 
an approach that goes beyond the immediacy of border crisis to instead look to the 
historical context from which it originates. To explore the connections between current 
island-mainland relationships and their problematic past, I turn to literature in island studies 
and postcolonial theory. I organize the discussion in four sections to capture different 
phases in Lampedusa’s recent history, following residents’ depictions of change during 
interviews.  
Table 2: Data documenting "sbarchi" (disembarkations) in Lampedusa, and total number 
of arrivals by sea to Italy.  
Irregular migrants stopped at the maritime frontiers of Italy 
Year Lampedusa Italy 
%Lampedusa out of IT 
total 
1999 356 49,999 0.71% 
2000 447 26,817 1.67% 
2001 923 20,143 4.58% 
2002 9,669 23,719 40.76% 
2003 8,819 14,331 61.54% 
2004 10,497 13,635 76.99% 
2005 14,855 22,939 64.76% 
2006 18,096 22,016 82.19% 
2007 11,749 20,445 57.44% 
2008 30.657 36,952 82.96% 
2009 2.947 9,573 30.78% 
2010 459 4,406 10.42% 
2011 51,753 62,692 82.55% 
2012 5,202 13,267 39.21% 
2013 14,753 42,925 34.37% 
2014 4,194 170,100 2.47% 
2015 21,160 153,842 13.75% 
2016 11,399 181,436 6.28% 
2017 9,057 119,369 7.59% 
2018 3,468 23,370 14.84% 
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I. 1986-1998: The Rise to Prominence 
A small fishing town with a history of emigration, Lampedusa made its debut on 
international media and in the collective imagination on April 15th, 1986. Libyan Colonel 
Gaddafi ordered two missiles to be fired in the direction of the island, which at the time 
was host to a U.S.  Coast Guard LORAN base (Taranto, 2017). This action was in 
retaliation for the US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi earlier in April. The two missiles 
did not hit Lampedusa, falling short of the island and landing in the water. In 1986, the 
mayor of Lampedusa was professor Giovanni Fragapane, a former member of the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) who would go on to serve two terms. In the aftermath of the event, 
Fragapane advocated for a peaceful dialogue with Libya in a move that would cause some 
controversy for what was perceived as an overly-benevolent take (LaRepubblica 1987, 
Hoelzgen 1986).  
As the residents recall it, the 1986 missiles sparked unprecedented interest in the 
Pelagie, with the event taking over national debates and making headlines in the New York 
Times (Dionne, 1986). Carlo, a 63-year-old resident who was among the first in 
Lampedusa to offer boat tours of the island explains this phenomenon, and his own unique 
professional ties to the geopolitical event. He says,  
“In Lampedusa the tour started… well, it wasn’t like there were that many 
tourists! They only came from Milan, Bergamo, and some from Rome, just 
to do underwater fishing. Free diving and underwater fishing. Tourism in 
Lampedusa was discovered when the Gaddafi missiles happened… with the 
missiles in ’86, the curiosity tourism arrived in Lampedusa.” He goes on to 
explain, “the boat tour, how did the boat tour happen… the tourists wanted 
to know where the missiles had blown up, in what area… but the missiles 
blew up south of Lampedusa, so they were not on the island. So, they needed 
someone to take them.”  
This once novel occupation is one of the most popular sources of revenue, with most 
vessels in the new harbor advertising all-day tours of the island complete with turtle and 
 
  51 
dolphin sightings and local delicacies on board. Since those first transactions in ’86, boat 
tours have reliably provided income to Carlo and much of his extended family, with his 
son and son-in-law setting up their own businesses right next to his vessel in the old harbor. 
This testimony is one of many highlighting how island residents were able to harness the 
visibility obtained in connection to this unsettling geopolitical development to build an 
increasingly competitive tourism industry. Participants consistently identified curiosity as 
a key element of Lampedusa’s tourism offering from the inception of the industry before 
the increase in migrant arrivals which once again catapulted the island to the front pages.  
As evidenced by the presence of the LORAN base, Lampedusa was already a 
militarized space in the 1980s, pre-dating the wave of securitization of migration in the 
1990s contemporaneous with the establishment of Schengen and the EU zone. As Mountz 
explains, the colonial history of islands as strategic sites for defense and detention results 
in “residual material landscapes” (2011:118) often used to accommodate modern 
infrastructure of enforcement. In this sense, Lampedusa was primed for its modern role as 
a site in the “enforcement archipelago” by its history as a penal colony in the late 1800s 
and as strategic outpost during World War II, when the Italian government sponsored the 
construction of forts, barracks, and bases (Taranto, 2017). By 1986, Lampedusa already 
housed an Italian air force station first established in 1958, and the LORAN facility, which 
was designated as a NATO base and eventually decommissioned in 1994 (Askavusa, 
2018a).  
It is through the 1990s that the EU and Italy move towards securitization, linking 
the system of defense and that of border enforcement. For most of the 1990s, irregular 
migration into Italy had concentrated along the Adriatic Coast, as people fled violence and 
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turmoil in the Balkans, and especially Albania. Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, as 
international agreements between Italy and Albania and the solidification of the EU zone 
occurred, the Adriatic route became less viable, and the Mediterranean saw an increase in 
crossings (Lutterback, 2009). In Rome, two key pieces of legislation governing the subject 
of mobility and border enforcement are passed: law n.39 of 1990, informally known as 
Legge Martelli, and law n.40 of 1998, or Legge Turco-Napolitano. It is the latter that 
importantly shifts the reality of border enforcement on the island of Lampedusa by 
establishing the first formal facilities of administrative detention, termed Centri di 
Permanenza Temporanea (CPT) (Centers of Temporary Stay). At this time, the facility in 
use for this purpose was a small building on the airport property, next to the runway.  
As participants Sofia, Carlo, Marco, and Stefania explain, prior to the establishment 
of formal detention facilities, arrivals were on a much smaller scale, featuring little 
formality and more involvement of the residents. Most of the migrants who reached the 
island’s shores left from nearby Tunisia. Recalling what the management of arrivals was 
like at the end of the 1990s, business-owner and long-time resident Sofia says,  
“Well at the time… and I am talking about 20 years ago. Here we had three 
carabinieri (policemen), a priest, three people from the Coast Guard, 
because we have a harbor. We could have never imagined that 20 years later 
we would have lived what we have.”   
A similar testimony emerged during my interview with Marco. He is 34 years old and 
though he spent many of his formative years on the island where his parents own a business, 
he is now a transient resident who returns every summer from Naples to sell his artisanal 
wares. He recalls,  
“Since the Schengen border entered into force, everything changed. 
Immigrants have always arrived in Lampedusa. Before, they used to arrive 
alone on inflatable rafts. There just wasn’t all this… no hotspot, no military, 
it was simple. The island managed it.”  
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As these testimonies contend, migration to Lampedusa is nothing new and is not in itself 
conducive to a state of “crisis.” In fact, many participants explain the strong connections 
between the island and a history of connectivity, migration and multiculturalism. In doing 
so, they often refer back to earlier periods in the island history, and especially to the origins 
of the Sanctuary of the Madonna di Porto Salvo, the patron Saint and protector of 
Lampedusa. Legend says that a hermit lived in the caves where the Sanctuary is now 
located, where he had set up two altars, one in the tradition of Christianity, and the other 
in that of Islam. When travelers reached the island in search of shelter and sustenance, the 
hermit would worship one or the other based on the visitors’ sails (Taranto, 2017). This 
popular and closely-held story is one of the ways in which the local population links the 
identity and history of the island to values of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Crucially, 
this local parable is also about adaptability and the sly leveraging of opportunity when 
dealing with outsiders.  
This phase characterized by informal management, sparse arrivals and minimal 
enforcement gradually came to a close, ushering in a decade of rapid change for Lampedusa 
and its residents, as the island becomes a pivotal site of externalization.  
II. 1998-2007: Towards Professionalization in Rescue and Reception 
Though the CTP became operational in 1998, it is in the early 2000s that the 
mission of administrative detention was more clearly outlined and actualized. In 2002, the 
right-wing coalition in power1 passed law n. 189 of 2002, known as Bossi-Fini, which 
hardened penalties for irregular entries and for traffickers, and broadened the role of CPTs. 
In Lampedusa, arrivals jumped from 923 in 2001, to 9,669 in 2002 [see table 2], motivating 
                                                      
1 Between May 30th 2001 and April 27th 2006, Italy was governed by the XIV legislature, under the 
leadership of right‐wing politician Silvio Berlusconi.  
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an expansion in detention capacity which in 2004 would translate in the construction of the 
facility in Contrada Imbriacola, still (partially) in use today.  
Throughout its history, the facility took on an array of nomenclatures; for ease of 
this discussion I will simply refer to it as “the Center.” The Center is located just outside 
of town, one of the few structures located in the hinterland and away from the shoreline. It 
is nestled between two barren hills and enclosed by barbed wire fencing, making very little 
of the facility visible to onlookers at the entry gate. It is a 10 to 15-minute walk from the 
Center to via Roma. Capacity fluctuates between 300 and 800 people, currently reported 
at 500 by the EU Hotspot briefings (Mentzelopoulou and Luyten, 2018). At several points 
throughout the island’s history starting in the mid 2000s, arrivals outpaced transfers to the 
mainland, causing overcrowding and the repurposing of other structures to the mission of 
“reception,” including the Area Marina Protetta Building on the harbor.   
For the people of Lampedusa, the opening of the Contrada Imbriacola facility 
presented and still presents both an economic opportunity and a challenge. Many island 
residents rely on six months of earnings for their yearly expenses, only rarely counting on 
intermittent work in the winter. With the intensification of bordering that first unfolds in 
the early 2000s, the island finds itself sustaining a year-round reception/detention activity. 
According to most participants, 20-30 families residing on the island directly depend on 
the Center for employment today, a number that has fluctuated along with volume of 
arrivals. Sbarchi remain in the 9,000-18,000 range between 2002 and 2007 [see table 2].  
The Center also brought more international controversy due to frequent human 
rights abuses and episodes of civil unrest. Amongst the most visible condemnations of the 
facility is the article penned by Fabrizio Gatti, on the cover of the popular magazine 
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Espresso in the October of 2005. The journalist had spent a week in the center after going 
undercover as an immigrant (Gatti, 2005). His story includes detailed descriptions of 
physical and verbal abuse perpetrated by the law enforcement personnel staffing the 
Center, and of lack of privacy and unsanitary conditions that all residents are subjected to 
while in detention. This was not an isolated case, as Lampedusa became a recurring feature 
of media coverage, often in relation to the migratory phenomenon more broadly and the 
growing number of shipwrecks and people reported dead or missing during the crossings 
(Nedge 2006, LaRepubblica 2006).  
The externalization of detention, the increase in migrant arrivals and the 
progressive securitization of migration caused military presence on the island not only to 
intensify, but also to become more visible and intertwined with the tourism industry. 
Military personnel are unusual in that they linger in Lampedusa beyond the regular tourist 
season and into the winter months. The increase in the staff brought forth the question of 
housing, as the island struggles to accommodate tourist demand every year and rental 
housing remains expensive and limited. Along with Italian military forces, agents from the 
newly established Frontex reached the island.  
As participants including Giacomo, Elena and Alecos explain, military personnel 
have come to occupy the island’s best hotels, with a premium harbor-view that puts them 
closer to their workplaces. Giacomo is especially cognizant of this phenomenon; as a 
restaurateur, he forged agreements with a number of leading hotels to grant guests 
discounted rates to dine at his establishment. These business affiliations have delivered an 
increase in the number of patrons, while also providing Giacomo with an enhanced 
understanding of the population served by the exclusive hotels. According to Giacomo, the 
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military presence in harbor-adjacent hotels remained pronounced in the summer of 2018 
when I was conducting fieldwork, even though arrivals had slowed down. On one hand, 
hotels and restaurants got a large new client base that allows them to continue working 
year-round. At the same time, the industry has become reliant on the continued presence 
of the military, creating an incentive for local support of militarization among hoteliers and 
entrepreneurs.   
It is in the early 2000s that in the narrow streets of Lampedusa, populated by carts 
of artisanal products and crowds of tourists, large police vans equipped with riot shields 
become a common sight. At the Giutgia, the closest beach to the town center, it is not 
unusual to witness law enforcement engaged in scuba diving training in preparations of 
rescues and recoveries, while groups of sunbathing tourists stare nearby. Giacomo 
explains,  
“when we were at peak for about 10 years in a row, everywhere you went 
there was military. You found yourself with the hotel full of military, 
beaches full of military, bars full of military, everywhere you looked, and 
rightfully so. In a way they had to be here, it was a time of arrival and it is 
their job… so we cohabitated. But I can tell you that it weighed on us.”  
Not less importantly, the image of militarized carceral island is not entirely compatible 
with the image of idyllic tourist destination what the island had spent decades cultivating. 
Scholars in feminist geopolitics have dissected state narratives and practices of 
securitization, arguing that performances of patrolling and bunkering as protection against 
a threat ultimately result in the production of fear and categories of people to be feared 
(Katz 2007, Hyndman 2012). Quoting Cindi Katz, “why would dressing for Desert Storm 
in the midst of New York City reassure residents and visitors of their safety?” (2007:349). 
In Lampedusa, the concept of “banal terrorism” introduced by Katz (2007:349) is seen at 
work through spatial manifestation of an escalating regime of military enforcement and the 
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experiences of the island residents. As Katz argues, the repetitive and highly visible staging 
of performances of security works as a constant reminder of the unidentified, ever-present 
and never-resolved threat among us (2007). In the case of Lampedusa, this staging of 
security and threat is not simply intended to be viewed and interpreted by the local 
residents. The media coverage and public attention devoted to the island enable the 
reproduction of these images and notions on a much larger scale.  
As Mediterranean crossings took the center role in public debate and the border 
grows more militarized and violent, residents saw a shift in the care provided to migrants. 
From solidarity at the local level through religious and informal institution, the Center 
provided infrastructure for a system of alternating NGOs, government agencies and 
initiatives appropriate for a “humanitarian battlefield” (Musaró, 2016:5). Along with the 
article penned by Gatti (2005), especially significant in these developments was the 
changing political tide at the end of Berlusconi’s 3rd terms as Prime Minister, which only 
lasted from 2005 to early 2006. The entering left-wing administration passed an 
administrative order that turned the CPT into a Center of Welcome and Temporary Rescue 
(CPSA), stipulating a maximum 48 hour administrative “stay” before migrants are 
transferred.  
In 2006, Project Praesidium also kicked off. This is an initiative initially financed 
by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs and enlisting organizations including the Italian 
Red Cross, UNHCR, Save the Children and OIM to provide assistance to migrants and 
oversight in the Center (Croce Rossa Italiana, 2019). It should be noted that this approach, 
first tested in Lampedusa, served as basis for the creation of what Italian non-profit Caritas 
refers to as “the Lampedusa Model” of humanitarian reception, which was later expanded 
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to Southern Italy more broadly (Caritas). Scholars in feminist geopolitics have critically 
analyzed the role of NGOs as expedient alternatives to state-provided services and 
contributing to what Nagel and Staeheli, citing Jeffrey, refer to as the “gentrification of 
civil society” (2015: 227). Central to these criticisms is the notion that while NGOs 
promote narratives of rescue and non-violence, the violence at the border is depoliticized, 
removed from its context. Additionally, international NGOs can take over important 
governing and administrative roles which were previously in the hand of local actors, 
shrinking the role of residents in management and decision-making.   
At the end of this second phase, externalization, humanitarianism and securitization 
are all clearly at play in Lampedusa, which by end of 2007 is becoming an increasingly 
common sight in national and international news media and an important laboratory for 
bordering. As NGOs, military and specialized personnel take charge of the management of 
international mobility and the border, the island witnesses the rise of a complex and 
profitable regime of bordering along with the professionalization of care.   
III. 2008-2013: The Height of Frontierization 
2008 marks a turning point in Lampedusa’s history. That year, 30,657 migrants 
arrived on the island, 82% of all sea arrivals in Italy [see Table 2]. Additionally, it is on 
June 28th, 2008 that “the Door to Europe,” one of Lampedusa’s most recognizable 
monuments is unveiled. The five-meter-tall sculpture by Mimmo Paladino looks to Tunisia 
from Lampedusa’s Southern shores. The impetus for the project comes from the national 
NGO Amani, supported by the local organization Alternativa Giovani. The monument was 
intended to be both a memorial to the lives lost in the crossing, and a message of welcoming 
and openness (VisitLampedusa 2019, Bolzoni 2008).  
 
  59 
By 2008, the left-wing government of Romano Prodi faltered, ushering the return 
of Berlusconi as PM, with Maroni as Minister of the Interior. In early 2009, the Center 
designation was temporarily changed from CPSA to Center of Identification and Expulsion 
(CIE). This move is about more than nomenclature, as it configures the island of 
Lampedusa as wholly frontier rather than part of the national territory. At this phase of 
externalization, all of those who reach Lampedusa are treated as if they had yet to reach 
Italy, still in transit. This framing recognizes the island as extraterritorial and further 
complicates the residents’ relationship with mainland actors by adding to the island’s 
legislative peripheralization and solidifying its role as a site of externalization.  
During interviews, many participants strongly maintained that life on the island 
continues to suffer the effect of what is more than just geographic or legislative distance 
from Italy’s core. 14 out of 16 participants explained that while the people in Lampedusa 
pay taxes and are expected to abide by the laws of the state, their basic expectations for 
government services and assurances are not met. Examples of significant gaps in 
institutional support are many, affecting infrastructure, education, resident mobility and 
access to healthcare among others. Born and raised in Lampedusa, 27-year-old Elena is not 
among the local youth who left the island to attend school on the mainland or in Sicily. 
Having attended elementary school, middle school and high school classes in the local 
facilities, Elena recounted instances of widespread flooding and the common occurrence 
of teacher absenteeism. According to the participant, disruptions to educational continuity 
are especially common in high school classes because most of the assigned teachers are 
not from Lampedusa and often leave their families at home, prompting frequent travels. 
The elementary school is in such a state of disrepair that Elena recalls several instances in 
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which the local administration had to close it down, holding classes in the high school 
during afternoon shifts after the older students left.  
On the mobility front, Lampedusa faces additional challenges. The vessels that 
make the daily crossing from Lampedusa to Porto Empedocle are obsolete and faulty, 
making the nine-hour journey to Sicily unpredictable and uncomfortable. Weather 
permitting, the island airport maintains year-round daily flights to Palermo, with additional 
direct flights to other Italian cities including Rome, Bologna and Verona scheduled in the 
summer months. Though the local hospital does not perform many important medical tests 
or procedures, the residents only get a minor discount on tickets to reach better-equipped 
facilities, creating massive costs for those with chronic conditions. In the summer of 2018, 
the price of a roundtrip resident airplane ticket from Lampedusa to Palermo amounted to 
€111.33, as advertised on site by travel agency Agenzia “Le Pelagie.” The cost of the same 
flight for a non-resident was €137.91.  
In the face of long-standing infrastructural inadequacies and what 15 out 16 
residents identified as issues of chronic “mismanagement” of enforcement and migration, 
tensions between the local residents and agents of border enforcement intensified during 
the 2000s. Even as Lampedusa was becoming a central and increasingly visible geography 
of enforcement, many old challenges remained unmitigated, and new ones emerged.  
 In January 2009, 4000 residents of Lampedusa took to the streets in protest, 
blocking buses of migrants destined for deportation and giving interviews denouncing 
intensifying militarization (Repubblica, January 24th 2009).  In February 2009, the forced 
repatriation of 107 Tunisians sparked violent clashes in the center, which culminated in a 
fire that destroyed one of the buildings and caused significant damage to others. 24 were 
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injured. The fire also produced toxic smoke, which motivated a temporary ban on the use 
of water from the municipal storm water cistern. At this time, the mayor of Lampedusa was 
Bernadino De Rubeis2 (Comune di Lampedusa e Linosa, 2017). He served in this position 
until 2012. He is quoted in La Repubblica, saying 
“Thanks to the work of minister Maroni we have risked a carnage in 
Lampedusa, affecting both migrants and the people who work inside the 
center and the population. He has transformed the center in a lager 
[concentration camp], the immigrants are exasperated.” (February 18th, 
2009) 
For the rest of 2009 and early 2010, the Italian government continued with the line of 
preventative expulsions, a practice repeatedly condemned by international watchdogs and 
government bodies, including the UNHCR. Touting two years of diminished arrivals 
thanks to the hardline approach, the Center was even temporarily closed in 2010.  
Tensions reached a peak in 2011, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. In 2011 alone, 
51.753 people arrived to the Pelagie [see Table 2]. At this point, the Center had a maximum 
capacity of 800. By the end of March, the estimated number of migrants on the island 
surpassed 6000. Though arrivals had significantly increased, it was the refusal of the 
government to organize large scale transfers to the mainland that precipitated the 
“emergency.” All interview participants unanimously identified the events that transpired 
in 2011 as peak “crisis” in Lampedusa, some like Sara and Leonardo saying that it was the 
only real emergency the island has seen. Others, including Giovanni and Alecos, refer to 
these times as the days of “invasion,” when outsiders starkly outnumbered residents.   
                                                      
2 In 2018, De Rubeis was sentenced to six years and nine months in prison in connection to a corruption 
and  bribery  scheme.  Investigations  found  that  De  Rubeis  and  a  number  of  his  council  members  had 
demanded kickbacks from entrepreneurs and service providers (Russello 2013, LaRepubblica, 2018).  
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As interview participants explained, for most of Lampedusa’s recent history the 
management of migration unfolded within the Center, with migrants outside the facility 
mostly presenting little concern for the local population. In early 2011, the whole island 
became a site of detention, one that the public eye becomes fixated on. Giacomo explains,  
“The Italian government and Europe had decided that they [the migrants] 
had to be on this rock, but they forgot about the 6000 residents of 
Lampedusa”  
The soccer field, the Area Marina Protetta center, the hill above the commercial harbor, 
and the town center and squares were packed with people, often without access to proper 
shelter, public bathrooms, and food. The state of chaos that ensued was such that Cristina, 
a participant who has lived in Lampedusa for over 15 years after moving there from Sicily, 
decided to leave the island along with her husband and her son to go back home. She says,  
“I think it was 2010 or 2011 that I left. I am telling you, my husband turned 
in his resignation notice. One could not live here. The harbor was full of 
police… everybody was… people relieving themselves on the streets… 
how can keep your son here.”  
After a short stint, Cristina and her family returned to Lampedusa as they were not able to 
find equally profitable work elsewhere. It should be noted that this period of complete 
disruption of daily life and activities on the island lasted for several months and represented 
itself to a diminished degree several times throughout the year. During this time, the island 
residents mobilized to fill in the massive gaps in organization and reception. Assunta, an 
artist and business owner who was working in the municipal administration at the time, 
took on advocacy roles to demand intervention and aid from the Italian government. Other 
participants, like Elena, Giacomo and Giovanni recalled islanders providing food, shelter 
and clothing when the institutions like NGOS, the Center and emergency government 
personnel were unable to do so.   
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A partial resolution came at the end of March, when then-Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi made a formal visit to the island with the promise of rapid migrant transfers to 
the mainland in what media outlets and participants alike refer to as a “show” (La 
Repubblica, March 30th, 2011). Seven interviewees were especially critical of this political 
visit, during which the former Prime Minister also announced that he would buy a 
beachfront home in Lampedusa3 and spoke about commitment to turning the island into a 
modern and highly successful tourism destination. Despite the highly publicized 
governmental intervention, the islanders remained outspoken about the role that 
mismanagement played in creating the difficult circumstances. Municipal council member 
Vincenzo D’Ancona famously launched a petition to rename the hill where many migrants 
had waited and lived as “Collina della Vergogna” (Hill of Shame) to emphasize how the 
situation that played out on the island represents a scar on the dignity of Italy and the 
international community (Rai, March 30th 2011).    
The feeling that the residents had been left alone during the Winter and Spring of 
2011 would only intensify with the coming of the summer season, and a revenue drop 
across Lampedusa’s tourism industry as a result of diminishing tourist arrivals [see Table 
3]. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
3 Silvio Berlusconi still owns the house that he purchased in 2011 and went on to remodel. The residence 
is located in Cala Francese. 
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Table 3: Data on airline passenger arrivals to the airport of Lampedusa between 
2005 and 2017 (ENAC) 
Passenger Arrivals on Commercial Flights (both scheduled and charter) 
Year Number of Passengers 
2007 89,476 
2008 95,246 
2009 91,494 
2010 95,010 
2011 85,552 
2012 83,851 
2013 96,430 
2014 86,651 
2015 90,886 
2016 111,409 
2017 124,222 
 
Angelo, who moved to Lampedusa in 2000 from northern Italy and owns a thriving ice-
cream shop on the island, recalls,  
“At one point in 2011 there was no tourism. If you would sit at the beginning 
of via Roma, you could see all the way to the end counting 10 people and 
no more. This is when the Lampedusani rebelled. Not much, but they 
rebelled… not that they did not want to welcome, or that the migrants were 
a nuisance. It was how the matter was treated. We organized, put on 
demonstrations.”  
Assunta echoes Angelo’s concerns from the perspective of somebody who was very 
actively involved in the municipal administration at this time of unprecedented economic 
crisis. She says,  
“There was a time that in Lampedusa, we did not work. We have spent 
roughly four years… we have risked… four years of true economic crisis. 
In 2010, 2011, 2012 tourists did not come to Lampedusa, because they were 
afraid. At the time I worked at townhall and I requested a line of credit for 
entrepreneurs because we were all on the verge of bankruptcy, and here 
there was no work.” 
On September 21st, 2011, during what usually is a time of celebration when the 
island comes together to honor the patron saint, the people of Lampedusa took to the streets 
again, this time armed with baseball bats and tire irons. Migrants who demanded to be 
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transferred to the mainland had taken three gas tanks from a nearby restaurants and 
threatened to set them on fire in front of the fuel station in the harbor. The locals led a 
violent charge, throwing stones and attacking not just the migrants, but also law 
enforcement and journalists, who they accused of contributing to the situation. That same 
afternoon, Minister of the Interior Maroni promised to organize rapid transfers (Ziniti, 
2011).  
Over the following two years, and to some degree to this day, Lampedusa became 
hugely symbolic and omnipresent site of bordering, a small municipality turned into a 
political stage for a myriad of visiting public figures, from Marine le Pen (Perrault, 2011) 
to Pope Francis (Carli, 2013). In 2012, former vice-mayor and environmentalist Giusi 
Nicolini won the local elections.  The next critical and path-changing event in the island’s 
history would unfold on October 3rd, 2013.  
It was early morning when eight friends out at sea for a fishing trip followed what 
they believed to be the screaming of seagulls to reach the site of one of the deadliest 
shipwrecks in recent history. The vessel had left Libya a day earlier, carrying 
approximately 540 people. The ship had reached Lampedusa in the middle of the night and 
stopped just half a mile off the coast of the Isle of Rabbits beach, selected by TripAdvisor 
as Europe’s most beautiful earlier that same year (Corrao, 2014). Sofia and Angelo were 
both on the fishing boat that day. The following reconstruction of the events from that night 
is based on their interviews, contextualized through the inclusion of news coverage and 
reports.  
The migrant boat had reached Lampedusa at night, and the darkness along with 
some faulty equipment made it impossible to approach. One of the shipwreck’s survivors 
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who Angelo keeps in contact with says that the vessel was circumnavigated several times 
by two grey vessels. The description provided by the witness matches the appearance of 
the vessels in use by the Italian Revenue Police in Lampedusa. At this point, the speed 
boats left without providing any information about an upcoming rescue mission or giving 
instructions. With the overcrowded boat now alone at sea after a difficult journey, the 
smuggler lit a blanket on fire to the attention of the authorities. This is when a piece fell 
creating a blaze that spread quickly through the decrepit vessel, quickly sinking it. It is 
estimated that the boat began to sink around 4:30 am.  
While it is impossible to produce evidence of these developments outside of 
individual testimonies of survivors, one thing that is documented is that upon receiving the 
emergency call it took the law enforcement one hour to reach the scene, during which many 
more lives were lost. The 8 friends arrived on the scene around 6:30 am. On a small boat 
meant for leisure and matriculated to carry up to ten people, the eight friends were able to 
take 47 migrants back to the harbor. Angelo says that they launched the initial SOS call as 
soon as they understood what was happening. He says, 
“I called them at 6:30 am… and they have tried to wring a signature out of 
me… they called me at the port authority after 7 or 8 days because I 
continued to declare that we had let them know between 6:30 and 20 to 7. 
But they arrived out at sea at 7:25 am. Do you know how many died in that 
window? Because they had their internal issues, but we do not care about 
their internal issues” 
Only 155 people survived, with 368 confirmed casualties and 20 missing, their bodies 
never recovered. 
This event received media coverage through much of Europe: from shock, to 
horror, to calls for unity in mourning (IlPost 2013, il Fatto Quotidiano 2013). The 
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shipwreck created an emotional response that can be better understood by looking to 
Tickin’s writing about the use of humanitarian narratives in France: 
“[…]while humanitarianism is often understood as driven by emotions—
compassion, empathy, benevolence, pity—in fact, it relies on a very narrow 
emotional constellation, and this in turn constrains our responses. 
Humanitarianism provides little room to feel and recognize the value of 
particular lives (versus life in general), or to mourn particular deaths (versus 
suffering in general); and little impetus to animate political change.” 
(2016:256) 
In the wake of the shipwreck, the local population saw the signs and heard the 
stories of neglect on the part of official agents of enforcement, including the coast guard. 
All the same, they found themselves faced with national coverage of a humanitarian 
tragedy. The shipwreck and its casualties as my research participants witnessed them, 
reveal that mismanagement and delayed action exacerbated the situation4. 
Many individuals and groups on the island remained vocal about the unanswered 
questions and disturbing allegations against the port authority. The Askavusa collective 
produced and circulated online a report and video called “Lampedusa, Oct. 3rd, 2013, The 
shipwreck of truth” (Askavusa, 2018b). Additionally, Lampedusa’s eye doctor and 
member of that first rescue team had his story captured in a book, written with the 
collaboration of BBC journalist Emma Kirby.  L’Ottico di Lampedusa (Lampedusa’s Eye 
Doctor) describes the dramatic rescue, as well as the man’s experience coming up against 
a wall of disinformation and secrecy and being target of intimidatory and forceful behavior 
by law enforcement in the days after the shipwreck (Kirby and Calza, 2017). Angelo and 
Sofia both maintain connections with a number of the survivors that they helped to safety. 
                                                      
4 Arguably, even if law enforcement had followed protocol in the morning of October 3rd, the conditions that make the Mediterranean crossing so 
dangerous have very little about them that is “natural.” Asylum seekers as well as migrants are forced to pay exorbitant fees to secure illegal passage 
with smugglers traveling on unreliable vessels, in inhumane conditions. 
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They also continue to discuss their experience and the circumstances around the shipwreck 
with tourists, researchers and other outsiders to disrupt the notion that the event was 
unavoidable or that increased military enforcement is a fit solution in preventing more 
casualties. 
The October 3rd shipwreck was closely followed by another deadly incident, on 
October 11th. This time, 268 perished; at least 60 of the victims were children and many 
were fleeing from Syria. Though this took place approximately 75 miles from Lampedusa, 
the island was commonly associated with the event. This time too, institutional neglect was 
at the root of the high death toll, with the Italian navy refusing to answer repeated calls for 
help over the course of five hours. On October 18th, a mere two weeks after the first 
shipwreck, the events in Lampedusa were declared as the impetus for the creation of a new 
maritime monitoring operation by the Italian Navy.  
The new military initiative was named “Mare Nostrum” – a security response to 
what was presented as a humanitarian need. The central aims of the operation were 
“safeguarding lives out at sea and bringing human traffickers to justice” (Senato della 
Repubblica, 2019). Operation Mare Nostrum combined national security and humanitarian 
rescue, further blurring the boundary between the two and intensifying what scholars refer 
to as “the humanitarian-security nexus” (Garelli et al 2018, Andersson 2017). In analyzing 
the visual politics of the operation, Musaró explains the humanitarian character of the 
highly-publicized monitoring effort, one that could be followed by far away audiences 
through an official Twitter account (Musarò, 2016:8). Ultimately, the “emergency” 
declared by the national government allows for an expansion of the space of “rescue” 
beyond national waters. With the start of Mare Nostrum came a move towards maritime 
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enforcement carried out by vessels too large to enter Lampedusa’s harbor, shifting the 
island’s role as a geography of enforcement and ushering in a new phase.  
IV. 2013-Present: The End? 
When I arrived in Lampedusa in the early summer of 2018, the Center had been 
declared temporarily closed by newly-elected mayor Salvatore Martello, who campaigned 
on the promise of making the change permanent. The internationally popular former-
Mayor Giusi Nicolini who held the leadership role from 2012 to 2017 on a message of 
solidarity came in third, surpassed by two candidates who had promoted hardline 
approaches to the migration phenomenon. Countless times during my stay, participants and 
casual interlocutors alike told me that arrivals in Lampedusa and the island’s role as a site 
of border enforcement were in fact “over.” Others maintained a much more skeptical 
outlook, emphasizing that because the crisis and the arrivals were always organized, there 
is no certainty that Lampedusa’s role as port of mass arrival is over. How did enforcement 
on the island take such a turn? Are the days of mass arrival and dramatic staging of 
bordering really over for Lampedusa? 
After 2013 and with renewed intensity after a shipwreck in April 2015 claimed 800 
victims just off the coast of Libya, Italy and the European Union pursued externalization 
to the high seas and to the sender countries. They did so by cracking down on smuggling 
and investing in maritime military enforcement and rescue. When Mare Nostrum ended in 
2014, EU-partners launch Operation Triton followed by Operation Themis in 2018, both 
run by Frontex. In April 2015 the European Commission also announced a new “hotspot” 
strategy; this designated a number of first reception facilities across Italy and Greece “that 
were faced with the arrival of disproportionate numbers of migrants” (Mentzelopoulou and 
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Luyten, 2018:2). As of October 2015, Lampedusa’s Center is a hotspot with an official 
capacity of 5005.  
In the March of 2018 when I was preparing for fieldwork, the Ministry of the 
Interior announced that the facility would close for renovations after being set ablaze by a 
group of migrants earlier that winter. The news came on the heels of the suicide of a 
Tunisian man named Alí earlier in January (Camilli, 2018) and followed additional reports 
of human rights abuses by humanitarian associations. When I arrived in Lampedusa in late 
May, the status of the hotspot remained unclear, somewhere between the official news of 
a temporary shutdown, and the unofficial reporting that activities were carrying on. My 
question to participants during each interview I asked whether the migrant reception center 
was open or closed at that moment, yielded a multitude of answers including “no,” “who 
knows, it is only closed if nobody shows up,” “yes, temporarily because they set it on fire,” 
and “it’s a mystery.” 
Nevertheless, the Center proved to be a popular topic of discussions in interviews 
in which residents widely disagreed about whether or not the Center should and/or will 
reopen. Aligning himself with the starkest of condemnations of the facility, Marco says:  
“I believe that a center such as this should not exist in Lampedusa. Period. 
One can manage the migration situation, the phenomenon, in an intelligent 
manner. Also, with the safeguarding of the human rights of these people in 
mind. The reception center is a Lager. It is nothing but a prison.” 
Later in the interview, Marco also referred to the facility as a “Guantanamo.” The 
disturbing association of the reception center with a “Lager” or a concentration camp was 
                                                      
5 The island’s Center was the first EU hotspot to become fully operational in Italy. This arrangement is intended to provide EU support to the personnel in the 
identification and reception stages, as well as oversight in channeling applicants into the appropriate protocols for asylum and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non‐refoulment.  
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also evoked by Anna and Stefania. Leonardo also picked up that same language to refute 
it, as part of his denial of the reports about the facility: 
“If the reception center was a concentration camp, which it has never been, 
then I would be opposed to the re-opening. […] The center, yes… it is 
managed by an external body which is not from the island, and deals with 
accepting these migrants, giving them food, clothing, and if they have health 
problems help them. But that’s it, everything is very organized, everything 
really good as a service”  
Though the future of the facility long-term remains unknown, during my time on the island 
and since then, the facility has remained operational, with authorities directing the 
occasional arrivals to the hotspot Contrada Imbriacola. The emphasis on maritime 
interception and large operations has redirected the focus from Lampedusa’s small harbor, 
to the better-equipped Pozzallo, Trapani and Taranto, among others.  
Starting in 2015, the residents also began to see an increase in tourism that some 
participants including Sara and Elena call “a boom.” What might seem counterintuitive is 
that it is the migration phenomenon that is in some way credited for renewed growth of the 
tourism industry, in a development that evokes the sensationalism of 1986. During 
interviews, residents showed a high level of awareness of how geopolitical processes go 
on to impact tourist and migrant arrivals. For instance, long-time transient resident Ruben, 
who as restaurant host and promoter spends much of his day interacting with tourists, points 
to growing fears of terrorist attacks and instability in the MENA region as a fundamental 
factor driving up tourist presences in Lampedusa, a safer alternative. Though residents had 
a variety of opinions about the push/pull factors of incoming migrants and the way the 
Italian government and European Community should manage the migratory phenomenon 
in Lampedusa and beyond, they consistently identified the “managed” or “organized” 
nature of arrivals, and their consequences on the island.  
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As participants point out, a majority of the sbarchi (disembarkation) were not 
spontaneous; instead, often times the Coast Guard intercepts migrants during the crossing, 
sometimes much closer to Tunisia or Libya than to Lampedusa itself, to then return to the 
island. As participants repeatedly argue, migration to Lampedusa is nothing new and does 
not present an emergency at times of efficient management. Arrivals are a part of the past, 
present, and likely future of the island. Additionally, the migration patterns were only 
deeply disruptive to daily life on the island in instances when transfers to the mainland 
were halted. According to my research participants, the narrative of invasion is in contrast 
with the reality of a concerted effort to externalize detention to the island.  
In presenting this argument, island residents provide a window into the geopolitics 
of mobility through their own perspectives and experiences. Scholarship in feminist 
geopolitics has argued for an analysis of the mundane and embodied dimensions of 
mobility, to both contextualize its space-making ability and to reveal its political character 
(Hyndman, 2012:248). In this sense, the movement of migrants, refugees, and tourists on 
Lampedusa is not simply impacted by individual choices and impetus for traveling. The 
chosen route, mode of travel, media discourses, and political attitudes towards a given 
group or location all importantly impact one’s mobility in ways that are obscured by an 
analysis of the phenomenon centering the role of the disembodied and dehistoricized 
nation-state (Ashutosh and Mountz, 2012). The resident population of Lampedusa, in 
pushing back on media narratives, interacting with migrant populations, tourists, 
humanitarian organizations, researchers and political actors, observes and contributes to 
the production of new geopolitics of mobility at a highly symbolic site.  
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Though some believe that Lampedusa’s role in the spectacle of bordering has 
reached its curtain call, they also recognize that the years of persistent coverage, political 
speeches, and real conditions of humanitarian emergency have deeply influenced outsiders’ 
perceptions of the island. Giacomo reflects on his personal experience with these 
representations, saying,  
“For 10 years, all the media publicity was negative, and we have been very 
affected by it. This has developed a psychological fear that is part of public 
opinion. What do I want to say… when I used to go visit my uncle in Milan 
15 years ago, there were people at the cafés, Milanesi who would tell me 
‘oh you are from Lampedusa? How beautiful, the sea, the Caretta Caretta 
[turtles]…’ so I had an identity. Now, if I go to Milan but even Palermo 
itself, they tell you ‘You are from Lampedusa? Ah I am sorry, the island of 
sbarchi [disembarkation]’ so… under this aspect they really have altered 
our identity… they recognize Lampedusa as the island of sbarchi and that 
is not right.”  
While it is difficult to assess how this change in identity goes on to impact interactions 
with outsiders, it is clear the enforcement agenda put forth by Italy and EU has deeply 
affected the way the island sees itself and its relationship with outsiders. The administrative 
excision from the national territory, and the use of Lampedusa as a convenient site of 
externalization have in ways emboldened island connections and narratives, calling into 
question the bonds to the mainland and sovereign authorities. Both during interviews and 
more informal interactions, residents invoked the idea of Lampedusa as non-Europe, non-
Italy, Africa, or as only considered and remembered by political actors in fashioning deeply 
exploitative plans, who do not consider the fact that there is a resident population. As 
Giglioli recognizes, the claims that Lampedusa and its residents are not fully part of Italy 
importantly reveal the fiction of the border as a sharp line of division. She writes,  
“These claims contrast starkly with the binary media representations of the 
Mediterranean as a ‘civilisational fault-line’ between migrants hailing from 
a ‘dysfunctional south,’ and a rich and democratic north that must figure out 
how to ‘absorb’ them” (2017:408) 
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This feeble sense of belonging to the Italian state has strongly reemerged in the past two 
decades, but it ultimately harkens back to the colonial history of the island and of Italy 
itself. Throughout Lampedusa’s history, the island has been exploited as a site for the 
remote detention of undesirable populations, its resources extracted to the point of almost 
total depletion, and its people forced to emigrate in the face of isolation and lack of 
government accountability.  
Collective amnesia, or as Stoler calls it “colonial aphasia” (2011) isolates current 
patterns of injustice from their historical roots, also obscuring the origins of the modern 
migratory phenomenon in European imperialism and colonialism. In Italy, this is further 
complicated by a history of internal colonialism that framed the southern part of the country 
as backwards and liminal in comparison to the industrialized north. This conceptualization 
resulted in systematic government disinvestment from the southern regions, south-to-north 
migration, and discriminatory representations of the “Meridione” (Southern Italy). 
(Giglioli 2017, del Boca 2003).  
In this sense, I argue that the current role of Lampedusa as laboratory for 
spectacular narratives and enforcement tactics should be conceptualized as the continued 
iteration of colonial registries. These should frame not only the discussion of island 
exploitation, but also that of the migration phenomenon itself. Connecting the present 
relationship between Lampedusa and mainland actors and recognizing a pattern of abuse, 
I argue that it is all the more crucial to give a platform to island perspectives to look beyond 
hegemonic discourses and address the material construction of emergency and difference, 
and the way it shapes the lives of those living at and crossing the border.  
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V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented an overview of bordering on the island of 
Lampedusa, integrating elements of conventional geopolitics such as legislative action and 
changes in enforcement with the embodied experiences of a sample of island residents. In 
doing so, I have both contributed to further contextualizing the human dimension of 
processes of securitization, externalization and humanitarianism, and showcased how the 
resident population is far from a passive subject of international relations as its members 
question, resist, and at times contribute to the reconfiguring of the geopolitics of mobility. 
By providing a historical account of the role of Lampedusa as border, I insert the current 
patterns into a framework that considers colonial ties between island and mainland, Europe 
and North Africa, and the North and South of Italy, to transcend the narratives of crisis and 
emergency and look to the systematic and intentional changes in enforcement that form the 
circumstances for this particular political moment.  
In order to further detail how island residents are implicated in the national narrative 
of bordering and in the production of border spaces, practices and representations, I begin 
the next chapter by discussing how different agents engage in borderwork, looking to 
interventions at the individual and organizational level. Then, I turn to sites of bordering 
on the island to further the argument that spaces of bordering are relational and contested 
and that through an analysis of these spaces, it is possible to shed more light on the 
production of difference and grassroot strategies of disruption.   
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Chapter V: Agents and Spaces of Bordering in Lampedusa 
 
Having provided a broad overview of bordering and some of its effects on the island 
of Lampedusa and its people over the years, I now examine more in-depth some of the 
ways in which participants and other residents have engaged in what Rumford terms 
“borderwork” (2012, 2016). Additionally, I look to a number of island sites as examples 
reflecting the relationality of bordering in Lampedusa. I argue that this lens enriches the 
discussion and analysis of the Mediterranean border by showing the highly-contested 
nature of processes of securitization, externalization and humanitarianism on the island, 
one that is often not captured by media narratives and political speeches centering 
“emergency.”   
The focus on spatial manifestations of bordering across a number of sites is rooted 
in the recognition of the political importance of space. Massey’s theorization of space as a 
product of interrelations (2005) enables my approach to these sites as constantly-shifting 
archives which make visible the contested nature of bordering, and the divergent 
interpretations of “crisis” in Lampedusa. In approaching space as a vehicle for storytelling, 
I incorporate insights from authors including Le Espiritu (2014) and Gade (2010), who 
look to “scriptoral landscapes” to conceptualize how traumatic events, political aims and 
identity narratives are memorialized through space.  
In this chapter, I seek to center the interventions and acts of resistance of the 
residents to highlight how they revendicated their agency in the face of government 
exploitation, lack of assistance, and the island’s rise to international fame. I only begin to 
explore the complexity of the resident population, made up of just over 6000 individuals 
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motivated by widely divergent ideologies, economic ties, and personal aims; As Rumford 
explains,  
“seeing like the border does not necessarily mean identifying with the 
subaltern, the dispossessed, the downtrodden, the marginal. The border may 
be the project of those seeking to gain further advantage in society: 
entrepreneurs or affluent citizens for examples.” (2012:897)  
It is certainly the case that engagement with bordering in Lampedusa is motivated 
by a number of factors. This consideration is further complicated by Lampedusa 
“islandness” and its pronounced reliance on the mainland for services, funds, enforcement 
personnel and tourist revenue. Here, I look at how ordinary people shape the border, and 
how bordering as a cultural encounter shapes local spaces and activism.  
To begin my discussion, I turn once again to the spectacular retellings of bordering 
on Lampedusa and discuss the representation of the resident population under the trope of 
the “good Lampedusano.” I look to diverse forms of engagement to highlight what is a 
much more complex snapshot of resident interventions and motivations for engaging with 
bordering. Then, I discuss a number of island sites to showcase how residents have 
intervened in spaces of enforcement, symbolism and memory to complicate or critique the 
practices and representations of bordering offered by official personnel, humanitarian 
agents, and media organizations.  
I. Lampedusa’s Residents as Agents of Bordering  
With the progressive intensification of Lampedusa’s role as border, the island itself 
became a symbol of solidarity, with the resident population playing a supportive role as 
“Lampedusani buoni,” the benevolent locals. The attribution of “the island of welcome” 
moniker is recurring in news media and commentary, with articles especially highlighting 
the efforts of the locals in making food, keeping the town clean, opening their doors to 
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those in need of shelter (Scavo 2018, Sannino 2019, MeltingPot 2011, Benelli 2016). Even 
at times of protest, as in the case of the September 2011 violent clashes, this familiar trope 
figures prominently. In LaRepubblica, Zinniti writes  
“The women who were at the dock with a plate of hot soup and clothes for 
the tiny migrants earlier this summer, now walk around the streets with 
stones in the pockets of their kitchen aprons. The men organize in patrols to 
uncover ‘those criminal pieces of shit.’” (September 21st, 2011).  
Though the island became an important node of solidarity, this framing of the “good 
Lampedusano” draws attention to humanitarian interventions aimed at tending to the 
migrants’ most basic needs rather than to forms of activism aimed at long-term change and 
critiques of state practices that are also taking place on the island.   
The trope of Lampedusa as an island of solidarity is best exemplified by the 
campaign for the Nobel Peace Prize, taken up after the October 3rd, 2013 shipwreck that 
claimed 368 lives just half a mile off the coast. Once again showing the importance of the 
media in crafting and upholding spectacular narratives of Lampedusa, the candidacy was 
proposed by director Gianfranco Rosi and supported by magazine L’Espresso. Ultimately, 
an impressive 55,909 signatures were collected, including that of German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas (Gatti, 2016). Gatti, the journalist who had authored the report on human 
rights abuses unfolding within the reception center also published a piece to support the 
campaign, in which he wrote:  
“A symbolic gesture for the fishermen, the women, and the children of 
Lampedusa and Lesbos to see recognized their heroic diversity in the new 
rampant culture of the barbed wire” (Gatti, 2016). 
The existence of the figure of the “good Lampedusano” is one that the residents are aware 
of, though some are more critical of it than others, who recognize themselves in the 
idealized citizen helper. The most popular criticism is one articulated by Giovanni, who 
says that while the people of Lampedusa are expected to collect prizes for welcome and 
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solidarity, they still do not have access to basic services, including a maternity ward or a 
reliable vessel connecting them to Porto Empedocle. This interpretation sees the trope as a 
way of obscuring the reality of what is like to live in Lampedusa by emphasizing a flattering 
reputation of welcome. In talking about media representations of Lampedusa, Sofia says:  
“The news that have come out of Lampedusa were false, and they have 
created a mythology, because of course… there are those that bring to the 
maximum level the “Welcoming Lampedusano,” and there are those who 
take us for prehistoric beings.”  
The spectacularized stories of local solidarity and rescue are also in open 
contradiction with the other images coming out of the island, of detention and violence. 
This image of a community of care serves a pivotal role in silencing reports the abuses of 
power and state-sanctioned violence that were contemporaneously taking place on the 
island, instead drawing attention to the lack of assistance. This framing also associates the 
Lampedusani with unquestioned “goodness,” a move that is both unrealistic and potentially 
damaging as interventions by locals to expand the powers of detention and enforcement 
are under-reported or misinterpreted.  
The humanitarian framing of Lampedusa and its people importantly leaves out is 
all the ways in which the state has criminalized solidarity at the local level and enlisted 
island residents in unofficial enforcement. This dynamic is not uncommon. Scholars 
including Huysman and Coleman (2006, 2009) have explained that the securitization of 
migration happens not only through formal acts of enforcement, but also through 
interactions at all levels of social organizations. In the case of Lampedusa, the 
securitization of public life is partially concealed by the spectacle of Lampedusa Island of 
Welcome, one that creates a dichotomy of military enforcement and civilian care and 
obscure the ways in which local efforts contribute to official operations. An example of the 
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mundane ways in which residents are asked to police migrant behavior is that merchants 
and restaurant owners were mandated to refuse them the sale of alcohol and tobacco 
products. While the municipal ordinance is presented as rooted in concerns for public 
safety, it is a clear attempt at governing behavior perceived “immoral” and performances 
that do not abide to the standards of migrant deference and victimhood.  
Island residents also advanced their own dichotomies and descriptions of good 
versus bad migrants that can be contextualized alongside of the analysis of moral 
geographies of asylum seekers in Italy by Garelli and Tazzioli (2013). Participants 
consistently differentiated between bogus cellphone-wielding economic migrants from 
Tunisia and respectable refugees from countries such as Eritrea, Somalia, and Syria. The 
port of departure was another factor in determining deservingness in the eyes of some 
participants, with those leaving torture in Libya higher in the hierarchy than those departing 
nearby Tunisia aware of the “weak spots” in Italy’s borders.  
In the unfolding of a media spectacle that alternated the depiction of horrors and 
the images of benevolent rescue, a number of local residents have become main actors. 
Former mayor Giusi Nicolini was at the center of dramatized coverage, becoming a face 
of Lampedusa is news media and tv panels. In one instance, she is defined as a “Rising 
Star,” while an article on AGI calls her a “Lioness committed to peace” (Palet 2016, AGI 
2017). Nicolini was mayor from 2012 to 2017. Amongst her most famous engagements are 
a 2016 state dinner with President Obama and then-Prime-Minister Matteo Renzi and 
winning the Stuttgart Peace Prize in 2015. Nicolini has repeatedly advocated for a strategy 
of migration management that is long term and not focused on a moment of emergency, 
while also repeatedly speaking in favor of NGOs and the system of humanitarianism, 
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recording an ad for Mediterranea in 2018 (Seminara, 2018). Her media campaign to make 
Lampedusa synonymous with welcoming did not yield positive electoral results. She was 
voted out in 2017, coming in third in an election that favored hardliner Totó Martello. She 
has received additional awards since leaving office, including most recently the Martinetto 
Prize by the Academy of the Sciences in Turin.   
Besides Nicolini, one of the most recognizable faces from Lampedusa is that of 
Pietro Bartolo, also known as the “migrant doctor.” Bartolo has gained international fame 
for his advocacy for migrant rights, and his interviews about Lampedusa and the 
humanitarian devastation he has witnessed (BBC 2016, Barbiroglio 2017, Bartolo 2018). 
He was famously involved in the filming and promotion of the “Fuocoammare,” 
documentary awarded the Golden-Bear at the 2016 Berlin Film Festival. In 2016, Bartolo 
published his first book with the collaboration of journalist Lidia Tillotta, titled Lacrime di 
Sale (Tears of Salt). The short memoir, also available in English, is introduced by the 
publisher Norton & Company with the following statement: “The internationally best-
selling personal story of "the doctor on the front lines of the migrant crisis (CNN).”  
The book intertwines the re-telling of harrowing migrant journeys featuring 
detailed descriptions of injuries and abuse, with flash-backs from Bartolo’s childhood in 
the poor fishing community of a pre-tourism Lampedusa. Through first-person narration, 
Bartolo reconstructs his sleepless nights and the pressure that his career and dedication put 
on his family. The cover is a picture of Bartolo standing on a cliff, with a grave expression 
on his face. He is depicted in black and white, in sharp contrast with the stormy and colorful 
sea in the background. At the top, right above the title, is printed: “my quotidian story as 
doctor of Lampedusa, between pain and suffering” (Bartolo and Tillotta, 2016). While the 
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book undoubtedly tells the stories of migrants, the story is that of Bartolo, a hero that was 
made by the weathering of the humanitarian crisis. The migrant stories are subordinate to 
that of Bartolo, as they serve as windows into the “quotidian” trauma that he is exposed to, 
the means of his emotional journey, his becoming the renowned “migrant doctor.”  
Though Bartolo is a ubiquitous spokesperson of Lampedusa as an island of 
welcome, his profession positions him as a fundamental agent of bordering, one that is also 
inserted in the national framework of enforcement. Health professionals, from nurses, to 
doctors, to medical examiners, play an especially important role in assessing and 
quantifying the trauma and abuse suffered by incoming migrants. It is on the basis of their 
expert opinions that asylum decisions are made, and the grueling evidence of a 
humanitarian emergency is circulated. As argued by Fassin, being able to provide proof of 
illness or visible signs of atrocities may be the only, or the most viable gateway to being 
given access on “humanitarian grounds” (2012: 86). According to Miriam Ticktin, the 
system of asylum and migration management more broadly requires specific performances, 
one of victimhood by the migrant and one of authority by the medical official.  
The bureaucracy of asylum dictates standards and creates expectations for asylum 
seekers, who must make their suffering readable to an enforcement apparatus that is foreign 
to them (Ticktin, 2011:61). Medical experts including Pietro Bartolo are given the de facto 
status of immigration officials that find themselves reproducing images and notions of 
compassion and decide what qualifies as humanitarian need. Because of the biopolitical 
nature of the asylum system based on medical assessment of human suffering, and because 
of the high-visibility platform that he claimed in the media border spectacle, Bartolo has 
become a powerful player. While he has capitalized on this, often through the disclosure 
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of intimate patient details, he is an example of an island resident that has influenced the 
national conversation by inserting his “daily” personal experiences in the spectacularized 
coverage and using them to advocate for change, as limited and illusory as that may be if 
the response is a purely humanitarian one aimed at addressing the “here and now” of the 
so-called crisis, and not the conditions which produce it.   
Having reviewed some of the factors and interventions contributing to 
Lampedusa’s framing as Island of Welcome in the face of emergency, I now look to 
different forms of engagement in the resident population, from the formation of networks 
to continue supporting migrants from afar, to acts of resistance that address the political 
conditions that produce the current migratory phenomenon and border violence. There are 
many examples of such engagements and they surfaced regularly during interviews. These 
interventions are especially transformative when they go beyond the immediate 
“emergency” created by spectacular politics and aesthetics of the humanitarian battlefield, 
to envision more long-term connections that address trauma and violence that is not only 
physical.  
One form of such engagement is the unusual Italian course ran by Nino, the 
archivist of Lampedusa. Nino, who is originally from Naples, built connections with 
migrants upon their arrival on the island as he offered them access to the computer in the 
office to reach out to relatives and made available the tv for soccer matches. During the 
migrants’ protracted stay, Nino began teaching them introductory Italian, realizing the 
importance of language skills in state determinations of who stays and who is sent back. 
Because the material that the class could realistically cover in weeks or even months was 
not enough, Nino continues to teach remotely. He developed a course-book, with pictures 
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and exercises, his own language class built specifically for migrants. The Archive’s 
Facebook page has become a hub for Nino’s “sons,” as he calls them, to form connections 
and inquire about the state of things on the island, which some express a desire to return 
to. When I stopped by the archive at the end of the day, it was common to find Nino video 
calling a young man in Turin, in Rome, in Paris, a unique Lampedusa diaspora that he still 
follows and tries to help from the island. Though Nino is not one of the interview 
participants, he was a helpful point of contact and knowledgeable guide during my time in 
the field. Before I left, he gave me a copy of his alternative textbook. 
Through the stories of interview participants, I saw many other ways in which 
individual residents were inspired to act. After what she describes as the “shock” of 2011, 
Assunta adopted a boy from Mali that arrived in Italy as an unaccompanied minor. 
Interestingly, her adopted son first arrived in Italy through Pozzallo and not Lampedusa.   
Since the 2013 shipwreck that caused 366 fatalities, Angelo along with others who have 
maintained connections with the survivors, ensure that those who made it safe to 
Lampedusa after that terrible night can return for one or more of the yearly celebrations 
October 3rd if they wish to do so, to commemorate the lives lost half a mile off the coast of 
one of the most militarized islands in the Mediterranean. The residents also mobilize their 
tourist acquaintances to link migrants to potential employers, legal professionals, and 
supportive figures on the mainland, extending connections formed in Lampedusa far 
beyond the Central Mediterranean.  
II. Contested Spaces of Bordering  
I now examine a number of sites to showcase how residents have intervened on 
island spaces to reclaim agency over the territory and point to the contradictions in the 
enforcement and spectacularization of the Mediterranean border.  
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a) Molo Favaloro 
Molo Favaloro is a dock that stands at the entrance of the harbor and the designated 
landing area of all migrant vessels. While the dock is highly militarized, and access is only 
granted to authorized personnel, the events that unfold there are clearly visible from the 
belvedere (panoramic viewpoint), overlooking the harbor. Recent arrivals are evidenced 
by a new dingy, or the frenetic setting up of dark grey tents. This is where many scenes of 
“the spectacle of enforcement” are captured by the media (De Genova, 2013). Here, 
migrant illegality is rendered hypervisible and the newcomers are framed as “excludable.” 
As De Genova explains, the “greatest theatres” for this type of production are sites where 
massive migrant inclusion takes place (2013:11). Such is the case with Molo Favaloro, 
functioning as the secured, fenced entry point into Italy for incoming migrants.  
Here, military personnel direct the arrival stages and start the bureaucratic process 
of identification, along with a time of detention in an administrative state of in-betweenness 
in Lampedusa. While Molo Favaloro is undoubtedly a space that serves as backdrop for 
scenes of arrest, it is also true that government and military personnel are often depicted as 
“saviors” as they receive crowds suffering after days at sea. Musarò refers to these common 
figures in the iconography of spectacle as “nurses with guns” (2016:9). The nature of 
maritime monitoring operations combined with fine-tuned media strategies, have produced 
a system of enforcement that markets itself as also providing rescue to legitimate its 
actions.  
Having taken stock of the symbolic importance and high visibility of Molo 
Favaloro, a group of island residents has intervened by posting an unmissable message on 
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the gate, facing the busy street along the old harbor. The local organization Alternativa 
Giovani hung a large banner titled “A Smile for the Press” [see Figure 3].  It reads:  
“While the rescue efforts continue, Lampedusa risks to suffer the effects of 
anxiety-producing language and information that is hasty, garbled, 
reductive, and at times even false – with the media presenting the arrival of 
migrants as an aggression, a siege and a menace to fear, without any respect 
for those who arrive in conditions of suffering, and undermining the 
economic results reached by the community of Lampedusa after years of 
strenuous work in tourism. STOP THE REALITY SHOW.” 
Under the banner is a faded mural, painted on the outer wall of the dock, reading “Protect 
People, not Borders.” Taking advantage of the visibility afforded to Molo Favaloro by the 
press, the Lampedusani involved in this initiative condemn and refute the narratives of 
invasion and aggression that are centered around the dock. In inserting themselves in the 
spectacle and its performance spaces, the residents revendicate their agency in constructing 
Figure 3:The banner affixed by Alternativa Giovani and mural, pictured in part. 
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the image of their territory. This “scriptoral landscape” produced by the people of 
Lampedusa expresses their proclamation through a spatial intervention that is “bound, 
durable, formal, succinct, and planned” (Gade, 2003:430).  
The message is a form of grass-root geopolitics in a highly visible location, making 
it hard to ignore for the media gathered at Molo Favaloro, but also the tourists walking by 
headed to the nearby beach.  In referencing “the reality show,” the authors recognize the 
spectacular nature of a televised display that is artificial and intended to stir negative 
emotional responses by using fear and anxiety. Pointedly, the banner employs language 
that is customarily used to refer to entertainment, not journalism. The criticism is in part 
directed at the disrespectful nature of media coverage of human suffering, but it also 
features concerns for the wellbeing of the tourism industry, drawing attention to the fact 
that there is more to Lampedusa than a stage of border spectacle.  
b) The Door to Europe 
Another symbolic site, one that is as evocative as controversial amongst island 
residents, is the Door to Europe. If Molo Favaloro stands as an emblematic site of 
militarized enforcement, the Door is an ever-present image in the coverage of Lampedusa 
as Island of Welcome since its unveiling in 2008. For many in Lampedusa, the Door to 
Europe became a symbol of anti-EU sentiment, material evidence of the effort to ascribe 
the mission of humanitarian rescue of the neoliberal West to the local landscape and 
delegate the role of welcome committee to the island residents.  
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On May 20th, 2018, on my first day on the island, I made a point to walk to the Door 
to Europe right away and see the monument that I had been reading about for some time. 
When I arrived, I was surprised to find that the landmark is located on a cliff, not far from 
the wire fence of the airport and just feet away from the failed infrastructural project that 
is the island water purifier. The sanitation facility was funded and partially built, but as it 
often happens on the island, the money ran out before it could be completed. It was only 
when I found myself right in front of the sculpture that I noticed two spray-painted sheets, 
anchored with rocks right next to the Door to Europe. The message was the same, written 
in Italian on one sheet, and in Arabic on the other. As soon as I laid eyes on the quote, I 
immediately recognized it from years of schooling in Italy: “Lasciate Ogni Speranza, Voi 
ch’Entrate.” “Abandon all hope, ye who enter,” the iconic warning placed by Dante at the 
entrance of the Inferno (Alighieri, 1320) [see Figures 4, 5].  
 
Figure 4: View of the Door to Europe and the banner in 
Arabic.  
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This intervention on the otherwise hopeful message of the Door to Europe was not 
permanent and it had been promptly removed when I returned to the spot a few days later. 
The anonymous author created a counternarrative of the symbol of open doors: Lampedusa 
is not the heaven, the port after the storm, the end of the journey. In fact, it is after seeing 
that quote that Dante’s journey into the underworld of human suffering actually starts. The 
admonishment is translated, both critique and warning, made readable for both the 
islanders and the migrants.  
Like the banner near Porto Favaloro, the Door is an example of how highly visible 
and symbolic sites in the media spectacle do not simply “exist,” and are constantly being 
re-made, challenged, and re-negotiated by a number of traditional and non-traditional 
actors. Though this oppositional display was temporary in nature, this use of the symbolic 
meaning of the Door to Europe as a site of grassroot activism is not unprecedented or 
uncommon. On March 18th, 2019, a rescue vessel carrying 49 migrants reached 
Lampedusa’s waters, to be refused entry by Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini.  A 
Figure 5: Banner in Italian, reporting the lines from Dante's 
Divine Comedy. 
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group of residents affixed a large red banner, reading “Aprite i Porti” (open the harbors), 
along with a hashtag #apriteiporti to facilitate and amplify a social media conversation 
about the standstill (Ruta, 2019).  The “Mare Jonio” was eventually allowed to enter 
Lampedusa’s harbor, though the vessel was immediately seized by the authorities which 
also launched an investigation for aiding and abetting illegal immigration.  
Despite the fact that several participants have voiced their disillusioned skepticism 
of the Door to Europe and its message, the symbol has made its way into the tourist offering 
and marketing on the island, perpetuating the association of the landmark with Lampedusa. 
The sculpture is on magnets, t-shirts and plates, even becoming the namesake for a store 
selling souvenirs on the belvedere. Tourist gift shops on the busting via Roma sell a small 
nativity scene, representing a black family, a husband and wife with their child [see Figure 
6]. The family stands with a turtle and seagull in front of the Door to Europe. Instead of a 
cradle, the baby is asleep in a small boat. This translation of the migration phenomenon 
through the use of local references and familiar religious iconography further emphasizes 
a message of compassion through the Christian re-telling of a refugee story.  
Figure 6: Souvenir of the nativity 
scene 
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So far, I have explored how residents have intervened on highly symbolic sites to 
problematize the media representation of bordering and to critique the system of migration 
management and border enforcement. Now, I look to sites of memory, to discuss how 
members of Lampedusa’s population have sought to intervene in the construction and 
portrayal of difference by humanizing migrant stories and by creating spaces to grieve the 
lives lost in the Central Mediterranean crossing.  
c) The Boat Cemetery, Porto M and the Museum of Migration 
Just a few hundred meters away from Molo Favaloro is the Boat Cemetery, a large 
plot of arid land located along the boardwalk in the new harbor. The lot is where most 
arriving migrant vessels are temporarily stored, awaiting destruction. Just to the right of 
the Boat Cemetery is the new soccer field, the center of the lively sport community in 
Lampedusa. On the other side, a large fruit stand and a few restaurants offering happy hour 
deals – known on the island as “apericena.” In June 2018, the lot was occupied by no more 
than a dozen vessels, spatial evidence of the slowing of migrant flows in Lampedusa as 
there has been a shift to large maritime enforcement operations that rely on better equipped 
ports in Sicily as operational centers.  
While it is now mostly empty, the Boat Cemetery was a popular subject of news 
coverage for many years (Shah 2011, Wall Street Journal 2015, Mills 2015) The images of 
innumerable piled up boats in the overflowing lot served as evocative representation of 
continued arrivals coming so fast that the space, that carved out plot of land, could not 
contain them. The display of the vessels also serves to reinforce racialized representations 
and understandings of migration connected to the familiar figures of “boat people” 
(Ashtoush and Mountz 2012, Loyd and Mountz 2018). The decrepit and derelict vessels 
are often featured in media pieces as symbolic testimony to the poverty that the migrants 
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escaped by reaching Lampedusa, that has now entered the national territory. They lay 
broken and fenced-in, just feet away from the kiosk renting white, shining motorboats to 
the tourists.  
For the locals, the existence and overcrowding of the boat cemetery created a 
concern in more than one way. Not only was the unkept space breeding grounds for ticks 
and a haven for the local stray dog population, it was also yet another space to become 
highly militarized. Angelo recalls periods of constant surveillance, and he says:  
“Can I remind you that next to the new stadium… there used to be the boat 
cemetery. There used to be armed forces 24 hours a day, with the trucks, 
the military, to look at what? What was going to happen?” 
Some residents also objected to the mandated destruction of all those vessels, arguing that 
the administration was wiping away traces of the island’s history.  
The Askavusa collective took initiative to memorialize artifacts from the Central 
Mediterranean Crossing by creating a museum doubling as performance space, known as 
Porto M. Askavusa is a small but fiercely lively group formed in 2009, involved in an array 
of activist pursuits on the island. Askavusa and his members address concerns including 
increased militarization and health risks connected to the proliferation of antennas and 
high-potency radars, to the rampant corruption that afflicts public projects on the island 
and the survival and reproduction of the unique and variegated cultural identity of 
Lampedusa.  
The small but functional Porto M is elevated, overlooking the harbor, seemingly 
carved out of the coastal cliffs of Lampedusa. The path from the belvedere to the colorful 
doorway of Porto M takes you through the “I choose life Stairs,” each step painted with 
the slogan translated in a different language. Inside are exposed artifacts recovered in 
Lampedusa, some in the boat cemetery, many in official and unofficial landfills around the 
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island where the vessels are disposed of after destruction. On the Askavusa website, 
Giacomo Sferlazzo recalls recovering the first artifacts while making his way through a 
heap of trash, in 2009. He says,  
“in an area, they had piled up the boats used by those arriving in Lampedusa, 
predominantly from Africa. There were large loads of ground up hulls, they 
looked like massive waves of wood. It was in one of these that I found a 
package carefully sealed with adhesive tape. When I opened it, I saw that in 
my hands I had pictures, letters, sacred texts” (Askavusa, 2019) 
Sferlazzo brought his findings to the other members of the collective, who began to aid 
him in recovering a wide array of items, from personal belongings, to kitchen utensils, to 
diaries. He looks back on the experience by saying,  
“In the landfill, ghosts wondered, energies of every time, the chorus of the 
last who emerged from the gut of the earth looking for bodies through which 
they can speak, mouths with which to scream, fists with which to fight, eyes 
to cry, eyes to laugh” (Askavusa, 2019) 
These objects, relics from human journeys of suffering who were swallowed by the 
chaotic piling and discarding of vessels, found a home inside Porto M. The space was 
inaugurated in February 2014. As the website explains, the displays rarely center 
individuals, rather letting the objects speak for themselves without imposed identifications 
or captions. The collection includes clothes, hanging on the wall above the desk, tattered 
shoes hanging from the ceiling, cans and empty plastic bottles, once sustenance for 
migrants out at sea [see Figures 7, 8]. Additionally, the grassroot exhibition contains a 
number of art pieces crafted by Sferlazzo using discarded materials.   
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         This alternative museum also emphasizes connections with the reality of 
migration outside Lampedusa, rejecting a view of the Mediterranean dynamics in isolation. 
Occupying their own shelf, there are a number of objects from other famously violent 
border landscapes such as the one between the US and Mexico and the Balkan region. This 
juxtaposition draws attention away from the individual or even regional histories of 
suffering, to emphasize the systemic factors behind migrant deaths, whether it be in a 
Figure 8: Lifejackets recovered by 
the Askavusa collective, on display at 
Porto M 
Figure 7: Kitchenware found in the piles of discarded vessels, in 
display at Porto M 
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shipwreck in the Mediterranean, or in while crossing the Sonoran Desert. Askavusa draws 
connections between different experiences of intimate geopolitics, to highlight the 
overarching global systems that produce “ontological insecurity” and violence at a variety 
of different scales (Katz 2007:360). Their activism, combined with media and academic 
interest in Lampedusa, has contributed to pictures of the museum and its artifacts being 
featured in a number of mediums, giving a larger platform to the collective’s advocacy and 
their critique of the regime of enforcement and its dehumanizing treatment of migrants 
(Shringarpure et al. 2018, Scott et al. 2018).  
 In the years prior to the official opening of Porto M, the work of the Askavusa 
collective and the growing reputation of Lampedusa as Island of Welcome, fostered at least 
in part by former mayor Giusi Nicolini, resulted in a demand for a municipal museum 
commemorating and documenting the migratory phenomenon. For a time, Askavusa 
entertained the possibility of contributing artifacts to the official facility before a rift with 
the mayor caused the project to fall through and motivated the organization to establish a 
facility independent of political pressures and the mediation of NGOs and media 
organizations with disparate aim (Askavusa, 2019). Nevertheless, the efforts to open the 
Museum of Trust and Dialogue for the Mediterranean went on, coordinated by the local 
administration and with the substantial support of actors on the mainland.  
The inauguration of the municipal museum on June 3rd, 2016 featured speeches by 
President Sergio Mattarella and Minister of Culture Dario Franceschini on the official day 
of “Memory and Welcome.” Though the island currently does not have a public library for 
adult readers or a movie theatre, the small museum secured a prestigious loan from none 
other than the Galleria degli Uffizi in Florence. For one year, tourists and locals could see 
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“Amorino” by Caravaggio, a gesture in memory of a small Syrian child that perished after 
the crossing, becoming a symbol of the current moment in Mediterranean migration 
(Corriere del Mezzogiorno, 2016). Just feet away from the museum entrance is a large 
mural, signed in the bottom right corner by the “Amnesty International Camp 2016.” After 
its first season, the museum closed due to lack of funding, only to reopen on June 20th, 
2018 after receiving a contribution by “Snapshots from the Borders,” a new EU-sponsored 
initiative.   
Though the second floor of the museum is dedicated in its entirety to migration and 
temporary exhibitions, on the first floor are exposed artifacts dating back to the Roman 
empire recovered on the island and in the surrounding waters. Albeit small, the collection 
is an important archive of the history of the island that can only be accessed by both tourists 
and locals when the museum is open thanks to a cash infusion granted by faraway donors 
in connection to the migration phenomenon. While mismanagement and corruption at the 
municipal level are partially to blame for the lack and unreliability of cultural initiatives on 
the island, it is also true that the local administration has to supplement for the insufficient 
government resources and services allocated by Rome and the regional government in 
Palermo. This means that cultural initiatives such as running the museum, the public 
screening of a documentary in the town square, or the opening of a children’s library for 
both locals and migrants are largely dependent on Lampedusa’s reputation and continued 
visibility as Island of Welcome and symbol of Mediterranean migration.  
d) Municipal Cemetery and Other Sites of Memory 
Along with these two museums displaying artifacts from the Central Mediterranean 
Crossings in an effort to document and humanize the migratory phenomenon, Lampedusa 
has also seen the proliferation of sites of memory that center the loss of life at the border 
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which has undoubtedly left a mark on the island. Many of the bodies recovered around the 
island have found their final resting place in the municipal cemetery, located in the Cala 
Pisana area. At the entrance is a sign titled “For a stranger, strangers do not cry,” a line 
from an Emily Dickinson poem. The placard reads,  
“In this cemetery rest an unknown number of women and men who died in 
the attempt to reach Europe through the Mediterranean Sea, in pursuit of a 
better future. Most of these graves do not bear a name, and the only news 
that we were able to recover about these individuals concern the 
circumstances around their death or the retrieval of their bodies. But all of 
them have lived. They have rejoiced and suffered, they have hoped and 
fought, and somebody has waited for them and cried their death. With the 
awareness that every fragment of history is capable of producing a crack in 
the wall that divides us from them, and in the hope that the memory of these 
lives is not lost, we must continue to tell so that we may reach a multiplicity 
of voices, such that they are deafening”  
At irregular intervals inside the graveyard, between the names and pictures of departed 
islanders, appear barren white signs with the seal of the municipal government. Sometimes, 
all that is reported is “here rests an unidentified migrant,” with a death date. In other 
instances, the sign includes some information about the family that the deceased had hoped 
to be reunited with somewhere in Europe or the life they had left behind on the African 
continent. Across the island there are other sites of memory, such as “Garden of Memory” 
located in the natural reserve of the Isle of Rabbits, where 366 plants were planted in 
memory of the lives lost in the October 2013 shipwreck. These interventions all reaffirm 
the individuality and humanity of deceased migrants with the aim of destabilizing us versus 
them dichotomies.  
Crucially, interventions aimed at memorializing the loss of life are often 
hypervisible in the spectacular retelling of migration, serving to establish benevolence and 
reinforcing the trope of the good Lampedusano. This too is part of a system of 
humanitarianism that privileges caring over curing, alleviating immediate pain and loss 
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rather than addressing the enduring conditions that produced the suffering (Ticktin, 
2016:62).  
As it starts to become apparent through this limited exploration of diverse spaces 
of bordering and approaches to borderwork across the local population, the engagements 
of Lampedusa’s residents with the border defy the narrow scope of humanitarianism, 
pushing back on the need for securitization and drawing attention to the damaging 
consequences of externalization. The residents who witness, contribute to and resist the 
daily production of bordering provide a much more complex interpretation of the system 
of enforcement and the political and historical circumstances at the root of the current 
migratory phenomenon. Their critiques do not follow the apolitical and dehistoricized re-
telling of border violence. Instead, some residents call out the construction of emergency 
by inserting their interventions in highly symbolic spaces, and pushing back on the 
hegemonic narratives of tragedy, welcome and Western egalitarianism.  
By bringing to the forefront the multiple experiences of those living at the border 
who are positioned to see the production of bordering over space and time, it is possible to 
identify some of the ways in which local perspectives contradict or importantly complicate 
the limited and dehistoricized representations recurring in border spectacle. Additionally, 
by looking at what the spectacularized narratives make visible and what they obscure, we 
can connect discursive framings and enforcement practices to larger political projects and 
trends. The frontierization of Lampedusa is far from a natural process resulting from 
geographic proximity: by designating the island as strategic node for bordering, detention, 
and rescue the Italian government and the European Union have justified the continuous 
expansion of enforcement powers and exclusionary legislation. 
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III. Conclusion  
Images and stories about Lampedusa commonly frame the island and its population 
in passive roles or at best as reacting to the interventions of official actors or the arrival of 
migrants. When residents are featured in coverage, they are often interpellated as witnesses 
of tragedy or as welcoming helpers, “good Lampedusani.” What these superficial 
engagements with the island miss is that the residents of Lampedusa play an active role in 
bordering and migration management, one that goes far beyond the immediacy of sbarchi 
and the limiting scope of humanitarianism. Outspoken actors like the internationally 
famous “migrant doctor” Pietro Bartolo stepped into administrative roles that are central 
to migrant processing and status determination, in a system that prioritizes bodily harm and 
suffering to poverty, conditions of prolonged instability, and violence that does not leave 
easily identifiable marks. Individual residents and local groups have gone on to become 
staunch critics of the regime of border enforcement for its treatment of migrants and its 
exploitation of the island without regard for the local population. Others, such as archivist 
Nino Taranto have leveraged the island’s position, simultaneously at the entry point into 
Europe and a destination of mass tourism, to provide long-term assistance to migrants. 
Through the incorporation of resident perspectives and the exploration of space as an 
archive of social interaction, I have considered a number of examples showcasing the 
relationality of bordering on the island.   
  
 
  100
Chapter VI: Conclusion  
 
In this thesis, I have begun to explore processes of bordering and space-making 
through the interactions and experiences of the resident population of Lampedusa. I argue 
that analyzing the perspectives of a sample of island residents and their engagement in what 
Rumford terms “borderwork,” can enable a critique of border spectacle that addresses the 
everyday construction of hierarchies of difference and of crisis narratives across space and 
time. This lens looks to both what is made hypervisible as Lampedusa as become a key site 
in the “enforcement archipelago” (Mountz, 2011) and what is more-or-less-deliberately 
obscured, to highlight the contradictions embedded in the EU and Italian regime of border 
control. I have identified a number of moments of resistance, including the countering of 
the hopeful message of the Door to Europe with a far-less-optimistic welcome and the 
creation of a community museum housing and displaying artifacts from the crossing to 
show the human dimension of Mediterranean migration. I have also considered some of 
the ways in which the island population has taken on an auxiliary role in bordering, with 
residents employed in the system of detention/reception and the local economy becoming 
more closely tied to the regime of border enforcement.  
I situate this project within an agenda for a “multiperspectival study of borders” 
(Rumford, 2012), contributing to the study of a highly scrutinized site through the 
introduction of an underappreciated point of view. This approach, which centers the 
knowledge of the residents and looks to space as archive of social interaction, offers a 
different angle from which to analyze the making of new geopolitics of mobility and 
enforcement practices, connecting them to a colonial history of island exploitation.  
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The central aim of this study is not only to make visible some of the dynamics that 
are muted by hegemonic discourses, but also to highlight opportunities for disruption. For 
instance, by analyzing the public engagement and harrowing stories recounted by residents 
in the aftermath of the October 3rd 2013 shipwreck, it becomes apparent that simply 
increasing military maritime enforcement fails to address the underlying structural causes 
that produced the event, as do calls for humanitarian responses that do not go beyond the 
most basic expectations for migrant welfare. Operation Mare Nostrum did not create a safer 
path to those departing or fleeing from North Africa; it did not investigate the allegations 
of slow or lacking assistance delivered by the Coast Guard; it did not provide mental health 
services for the people who saw carnage unfold before their eyes, who helped recover the 
bodies, who tried to rescue lives and sometimes failed. This is but one case in which the 
inclusion of voices from the island could help shape more accountable policies and more 
effective management strategies.  
Nevertheless, I recognize limits in my methodological and epistemological 
approach. Lampedusa is the coveted destination of a myriad of actors, from journalists, to 
researchers, to strategists, to artists, who seek to capture island happenings and landscapes. 
I found that the six weeks I spent in Lampedusa at a time of intense activity give but a 
glimpse into life on the island and the unique experiences of the residents with migrants 
and Italian mainlanders. As it became apparent through interviews, residents who have 
lived in Lampedusa for several decades, like Anna, Alecos, Cristina and Sofia remain 
outsiders in the tight-knit community. Additionally, in presenting my findings I remain 
mindful of what I should and should not discuss, aware that the local population must evade 
laws and regulations to provide care to incoming migrants and deploy their strategies of 
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resistance. Ultimately, I seek to highlight the relational nature of bordering without 
revealing too much information that might prove damaging. Though these are important 
considerations that will inform and shape my future research, I maintain that inclusion of 
the perspectives of those living at the border enables an analysis of bordering as a process 
enlisting a diverse array of actors beyond the state.  
Here I have just begun to explore the symbolic importance and evocative power of 
the island, which goes far beyond a corner of the central Mediterranean. Examples of 
Lampedusa’s international fame and influence are wide-ranging: the Cross of Lampedusa 
made from fragments from the 2013 shipwreck was blessed by Pope Francis himself before 
taking off on a world tour (Avvenire, 2017); in the northern German city of Hamburg, 
dozens of refugees founded the FC Lampedusa St Pauli soccer team (Videmsek, 2017); 
across Europe, thousands of migrants that left the island continue to connect through 
networks named after their port of arrival, finding community in their shared experience 
and organizing through social media platforms such as Facebook (Lampedusa in Hamburg) 
and Twitter (@lampedusa-hannover, @Lampedusa_HH). The residents themselves have 
been able to mobilize their position to gain access to conferences and public events all over 
Italy and Europe, gaining a platform. Others, like Nino from the historical archive, Angelo 
and Andrea maintain important relationships with the migrants that passed through the port. 
Also recognizing Lampedusa as redolent of history and meaning are government officials 
including Silvio Berlusconi, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Renzi, Luigi di Maio, Matteo Salvini, 
Sergio Mattarella and Enrico Letta, who have converged on the site in the last decade alone. 
Ultimately, it is evident that the island, or as some residents call it “the Rock,” is far from 
isolated or a bounded place. Lampedusa is a geography of connectivity, a space that shapes 
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faraway action, a complex site of resistance, militarized enforcement, tourism, and tranquil 
island life which stubbornly endures in the midst of two decades of rapid change. 
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